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Abstract
W ed e v e l o pa ne ﬃciency wages model, to study the eﬀects
of the imposition of a higher minimum wage on employment of
heterogeneous workers, when employers use the wage and moni-
toring intensity to induce motivation. It is shown that when eﬀort
is adjusted to exogenous shocks then the wage and supervision,
and employment and supervision can be either strategic comple-
ments or strategic substitutes. This ￿nding provides a theoretical
explanation of why the results of studies that try to identify the
wage-supervision trade-oﬀ(Neal 1993, Kruse 1992, Leonard 1987),
and do not control for eﬀort may be hindered by omitted variable
bias and thus are misleading. The total eﬀect of a higher mini-
mum wage on employment can be decomposed into two distinct
eﬀects; the ￿partial￿ wage eﬀect and the ￿supervision￿ eﬀect. We
show that, when the wage and supervision are complements in pro-
viding incentives then employment and supervision are strategic
complements, the supervision and the wage eﬀect are counterac-
tive and the total employment eﬀect of a higher minimum wage
is ambiguous. On the other hand if there is a trade-oﬀ between
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1wage and supervision and complementarity between employment
and supervision, then both employment and supervision fall, as a
result of a higher minimum wage. Employment again falls, if the
wage and supervision and employment and supervision are sub-
stitutes. In general, the magnitude of the positive employment
eﬀect of a higher minimum wage and the range up to which, one
can increase the wage and increase employment are exaggerated if
supervisory resources are ￿xed. Our analysis reveals that theoret-
ical work on the eﬃciency wage approach of the minimum wage
seems incomplete as the predictions of the seminal models(Calvo-
Wellisz 1979, Rebitzer and Taylor 1995) in the ￿eld hinge on a
number of simpli￿ed assumptions. Finally, our theoretical pre-
dictions reconcile with recent ￿ndings that point towards a zero,
or small negative or positive minimum wage employment elastic-
ity(Card and Krueger 1995, Brown 1999). Moreover, the fact that
our model can provide a theoretical explanation of the recent ￿nd-
ings from the fast food studies (Card and Krueger 1994, Katz and
Krueger 1992), enhances the validity of our predictions.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
The minimum wage is a highly controversial policy issue among econo-
mists, policy makers and even social activists. On the one hand sup-
porters argue that minimum wages consist an antipoverty device that
combat exploitation and contribute to a more￿egalitarian￿distribution
of income by bringing the living of the working poor in a minimum ac-
ceptable standard. On the other hand opponents argue that minimum
wages are not so eﬀective in reducing poverty, because most poor peo-
ple are not in the labour market, and that a higher minimum wage will
decrease employment of those that is initially aiming to bene￿t. Recent
evidence suggest that an increase in the minimum wage compresses the
wage distribution (Dickens et al. 1999), and that the majority of mini-
mum wage earners tend to be at the bottom of the earnings distribution
(Dolado et al. 1997, Card and Krueger 1995) and thus there is a posi-
tive relationship between poverty and low wages. Given these ￿ndings it
is easy to understand why the employment eﬀect of the minimum wage
has concentrated so much attention, as it is the key hypothesis for in-
vestigation that could shed light to whether or not the minimum wage
policy is bene￿cial for low-paid people. Until the late 1980s there was a
consensus on the eﬀects of the minimum wage on employment. Accord-
ing to the dominant competitive model of the labour market, a binding
minimum wage will decrease employment of covered workers. Time se-
ries evidence (Brown et al. 1982) supported this prediction and any other
theoretical model that predicted other than a negative eﬀect (Jones 1987)
it was viewed as an exception that proves the rule. In the late 1980s,
and beginning of 1990s, some changes in the state and federal minimum
wage laws in the US generated a good opportunity for further testing of
the prediction of the negative employment eﬀects of a minimum wage
on employment. Card (1992a, 1992b), Card-Krueger (1994, 1995) and
Katz-Krueger (1992) conducted a number of case studies and after reex-
amining past time-series studies with new data sets as well, concluded
that an increase in the minimum wage may have positive or no-eﬀect on
the employment of covered workers. Card and Krueger (1995) tried to
give an ex post rationalization of their ￿ndings by suggesting that their
results may be driven because of the presence of monopsony in the low-
wage labour market. Although in economics it takes a theory to kill a
theory and facts can only dent a theorist￿s hide (Paul Samuelson￿s adage
quoted in Card-Krueger 1995). Thus, there was a need for an alternative
3theoretical explanation of the non-negative eﬀect of a minimum wage
increase on employment of aﬀected workers. As we noted above, the
static monopsony model (Robinson 1933, Charles 1974) is widely pre-
sented in economics textbooks as a case where the neoclassical￿s model
prediction of the eﬀects of the minimum wage on employment is reversed.
Although, the static monopsony model has been criticized as quite un-
realistic, because low-wage labour markets are characterized by a large
number of employers. In general, any environment that could give rise
to an upward sloping labour supply at the ￿rm level, can generate the
monopsony result. Wage setting power and thus a ￿nite elasticity of la-
bor supply at the ￿rm level may also stem from the existence of labour
market frictions. Models accounting for search and recruiting frictions
such that presented by Burdett and Mortensen(1989), Lang and Dickens
(1993) and Manning (1993) provide a satisfactory theoretical explanation
of the recent empirical ￿ndings of a positive or zero employment eﬀect of
a higher minimum wage. However wage-setting power may also arise by
asymmetric information in the labour market. An asymmetric informa-
tion environment may arise when employees action or type is imperfectly
observable by the employer which in turn may be a reason for eﬃciency
wages considerations. In eﬃciency wages models, in contrast with the
neoclassical model of the labour market, worker￿s productivity depends
on the wage, and thus under some cases an increase in the wage may
increase employment (Manning 1995). There is a considerable amount
of evidence, con￿rming the eﬃciency wages story, in low-wage industries.
Krueger and Summers (1988), conducted an empirical investigation of
the eﬃciency wages hypothesis by trying to explain the wage diﬀerences
across industries and they concluded that interindustry wage diﬀerentials
cannot be solely explained by the traditional neoclassical reasoning of dif-
ferences in ability and working conditions, which implies that employers,
also in some low-wage industries may pay eﬃciency wages. Moreover,
there is evidence that larger in size establishments, pay higher wages
(Lester 1967, Masters 1969, Mellow 1982, and Brown and Medoﬀ 1989),
suggesting that a potential reason for this observation may be eﬃciency
wages arising from imperfect monitoring and shirking problems on the
job. There is additional evidence(Groshen-Krueger 1990, Krueger 1991,
Rebitzer 1995) supporting the shirking version of the eﬃciency wages the-
ory, which also predicts that, at a given level of eﬀort, an increase in the
wage will decrease supervision, suggesting a wage-supervision trade-oﬀ.
The above evidence are concerned also with some low-wage industries, as
4the restaurant, the hotel, the gasoline service and retail trade industries,
where supervision also seems to be an important aspect of production.
As suggested by the evidence and observations presented above, a shirk-
ing eﬃciency wages environment could possibly provide a fruitful basis
to generate predictions on the employment eﬀects of a higher minimum
wage, in low-wage industries, where the minimum wage is particularly
binding. In particular, a revised shirking model of Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984)
as proposed by Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) generates a positive eﬀect of
a minimum wage on employment, even when the number of ￿rms in the
industry is large. Rebitzer-Taylor analysis has been cited in all reviews
in the topic of the minimum wage as one of the alternative theoretical
explanation of the increasing employment eﬀect of a higher minimum
wage. Although, some researchers believe that predictions generated by
Rebitzer-Taylor model hinge heavily on a number of simpli￿ed assump-
tions. Chung-Cheng Lin(1999) extended Rebitzer-Taylor work to allow
for workers heterogeneity and conclude that, after this assumption is re-
laxed, employment decreases as a result of the imposition of a binding
minimum wage. Consequently they suggest that Rebitzer-Taylor result
is driven because of worker￿s homogeneity. Moreover, Chung-Cheng Lin
suggested that if in Rebitzer and Taylor model supervisory resources
are un￿xed then again their result breaks down. Furthermore, a model
that it seems curiously neglected in the literature is presented by Calvo-
Wellisz (1979). Calvo-Wellisz examined labor allocation and wage scale,
for a competitive hierarchic ￿rm, in a more general environment, than
those presented by Rebitzer- Taylor and Lin. Their major result is that
a binding minimum wage increases the quantity and quality of covered
workers and decreases the quantity, quality and the wage of supervisors.
Finally, Manning (1995) has been also concerned with the eﬃciency wage
explanation of involuntary unemployment, but also examined the eﬀects
of a minimum wage increase under diﬀerent eﬃciency wage environment.
Manning presented a combined monopsony-shirking model, where work-
ers diﬀer in their valuation of leisure and ￿rm has some ex ante ability to
identify workers who are more likely to shirk and concludes that under
this kind of environment an increase in the minimum wage will increase
employment and may also decrease unemployment. However, the exist-
ing seminal models seem to have some limitations and we also suspect
that may be their results are driven by some of their speci￿c assumption
that may not capture some of the true features of the low-wage labour
markets. In contrast with Rebitzer and Taylor and Lin where super-
5visory resources are assumed to be exogenous, Groshen-Krueger (1990)
suggest that empirical investigations of the wage -supervision trade-oﬀ
which include supervision proxies as an explanatory variable are hindered
by endogeneity bias as most of the times supervision consists a choice of
the ￿rm. Furthermore, as Rebitzer(1995) argues eﬃciency wage models
apply only where employee actions or type is diﬃcult to observe and
thus we also believe that it is often the case that the employer cannot
observe or imperfectly observes worker￿s type (in contrast with Man-
ning￿s assumption) especially in cases where the type is determined by
the employee￿s innate characteristic, such as the innate inclination to
shirk. Finally, in Calvo-Wellisz, it may be the case that their main pre-
dictions hinge on the hierarchic structure of the ￿rm or previous results
on labor allocation and wage scale that stem from this setting. Partic-
ularly, Calvo-Wellisz present diﬀerent variants of their model but they
devote a minor part of their analysis on the eﬀects of minimum wages on
employment of production workers, and thus they do not show how and
why results are changing, when slight alterations in the environment are
made. Our aim is to develop a generalized eﬃciency wages environment
that also allows for features that are not accounted by the existing semi-
nal models in this theoretical approach of the minimum wage, and may be
critical for the production of diﬀerent predictions. Our model captures,
explains and improves the results generated by the existing models in
the eﬃciency wages approach of the minimum wage, but also allows for
other predictions. Speci￿cally, we show that under workers￿ heterogeneity
the wage and supervision may not only be substitutes, as the eﬃciency
wage theory predicts, but they may also be complements in providing
incentives. Additionally, employment and supervision can be strategic
substitutes and not only complements as the standard shirking eﬃciency
wage model predicts. This may not be surprising, but it is a result that
hasn￿t been produced by models of similar ￿avor (Calvo-Wellisz 1979). In
particular, this result provides a theoretical explanation of why empirical
investigations (Leonard 1987, Kruse 1992, Neal 1993) that attempted to
estimate the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ and do not control for determi-
nants of employee￿s perfomance, rendered inconclusive. Determinants of
employees￿perfomance (training etc.) are correlated with supervision and
wages, creating a bias to the estimate of the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ.
Under a shirking model with endogenous determination of supervision
the employment eﬀect of a binding minimum wage can be decomposed
into two distinct eﬀects; The ￿partial￿ or direct wage eﬀect and the ￿su-
6pervision￿ eﬀect. The sign(direction) of the ￿partial￿ wage eﬀect of an
increase in the minimum wage depends on the sign of the partial elas-
ticity of employment w.r.t the wage, whereas the sign(direction) of the
￿supervision￿ eﬀect depends on the sign of the product of the partial
elasticity of employment w.r.t the quantity of supervisory resources and
the partial elasticity of supervision w.r.t the wage. It is shown that the
￿partial￿ wage eﬀect, which is equal to the partial elasticity of employ-
ment w.r.t the wage, is always negative, if workers are heterogeneous,
but it is positive, under homogeneous workforce. When workers are het-
erogeneous, if the wage and supervision are complements in providing
incentives( the partial elasticity of supervision w.r.t the wage is positive)
then employment and supervision are strategic complements( the partial
elasticity of employment w.r.t supervision is positive) , the ￿partial￿ wage
and the ￿supervision￿ eﬀect are counteractive and thus an increase in the
minimum wage has an ambiguous eﬀect on employment of covered work-
ers. If certain conditions hold for the partial elasticity of employment
w.r.t supervision and the wage respectively and the partial elasticity of
supervision w.r.t the wage, then it is possible for both employment and
supervision to rise, after an increase in the minimum wage. The wage
and ￿supervision￿ eﬀect are also counteractive, under substitutability be-
tween wage and supervision and employment and supervision. However,
under this case employment falls but supervision is possible to rise re-
￿ecting a substitution of supervisors for workers. Finally, when there is
at r a d e - o ﬀ between wage and supervision and complementarity of em-
ployment and supervision as the eﬃciency wages models predict then
both employment and supervision fall. When workers are homogeneous
and supervision is endogenous, the partial wage eﬀect is exactly oﬀset by
the ￿supervision￿ eﬀect, and thus employment remains unchanged, while
supervision falls, after the imposition of a binding minimum wage. In
general, another implication of the decomposition of the minimum wage
eﬀect on employment into the partial wage and the ￿supervision￿ eﬀect is
that the minimum wage employment elasticity (whatever its sign) is more
pronounced under ￿xed than under endogenous supervisory resources1.
Moreover, the range up to which, one can increase the wage and increase
employment is smaller, when the supervision is determined endogenously.
Therefore, given this last ￿nding and the fact that in Rebitzer and Tay-
lor model, supervisory resources are assumed to be ￿xed, it is clear that
1The only case, where this doesn￿t hold is under case 2 in the following sections
7Rebitzer and Taylor exaggerate the positive minimum wage employment
e l a s t i c i t ya n dt h er a n g eu pt ow h i c ha ni n c r e a s ei nt h ew a g ew i l li n c r e a s e
employment. Rebitzer and Taylor result, is sustained, for a just binding
minimum wage, under endogenous supervision, only if supervisors decide
between shirking or working as well as workers and technology exhibits
constant returns to scale into eﬃcient labour units. It is also shown that,
in Calvo-Wellisz the assumption of constant returns to scale in eﬃcient
labour units is critical for their result that up to a point an increase in
the minimum wage increases the employment of workers and decreases
that of supervisors. Our predictions reconcile with recent evidence(Card-
Krueger 1995, Brown 1999) of the estimated minimum wage employment
elasticity, which point towards a small negative, positive or even a zero
eﬀect of a higher minimum wage on the employment of covered workers.
In particular, our model may provide an alternative theoretical expla-
nation of the employment gains reported in the popular fast food case
studies conducted by Card and Krueger (1994) and Katz and Krueger
(1992) which suggest that after the minimum wage increase, employment
increased in low-wage, more aﬀected restaurants, relative to high-wage,
less aﬀected restaurants.
2T h e W o r k e r
Consider a competitive industry, with a large number of identical ￿rms,
where the representative ￿rm recruits a number of low-skilled, low-wage
workers to produce a single product. Workers are heterogeneous, in￿-
nitely lived and risk neutral with instantaneous utility function given
by
U(w,e;θ)=w − θe,(1)
where θ is the parameter of heterogeneity and denotes the marginal disu-
tility of eﬀort, which will assume that it is uniformly distributed between
zero and one. The higher the θ t h em o r et h ew o r k e rd i s l i k e st op u t
forth eﬀort. Moreover, a worker of type θ enjoys spending wage w and
dislikes putting forth eﬀort e. We will assume that the ￿rm cannot ob-
serve the worker￿s characteristic, because of asymmetric information and
thus it cannot screen the workers with higher θ2. A worker is hired at
the beginning of each year and then he or she must decide whether he
or she will work or shirk. If the worker shirks then he/she contributes
2If θ is observable then the model becomes similar to Manning.
8zero eﬀort and if he or she works then he or she contributes a positive
level of eﬀort which for simplicity we will assume it is equal to one. The
employer cannot perfectly observe employees￿ eﬀort, even though he em-
ploys supervisors who monitor workers and try to detect shirkers. We
will assume that dismissal threats, is the only device available to em-
ployers to prevent shirking and thus there is no other way to solve the
problem of asymmetric information( bonding or entry fee). On the other
hand supervisors are employed from a pool, homogeneous, non-shirking
workers, and their price is given and independent of the wage of workers3.
The instantaneous probability of detection of a shirker is given by:
P = Min{
N
L
,1},(2)
,where Nand L is the quantity of supervisors and workers respectively
employed by the ￿rm4.W e w i l l a s s u m e t h a t 1 in equation (2) is never
binding5, which holds as long as the cost of supervision is increasing
suﬃciently fast with the number of supervisors. Furthermore, detection is
taking place at the beginning of each period and workers who are caught
shirking ￿ow to unemployment and receive an unemployment bene￿t ￿.
The instantaneous probability that a worker will be separated from his
or her job due to exogenous reasons is q.L e t r represent the discount
rate and sto be the exogenous probability that an unemployed worker
will ￿nd a job. The present discounted value(p.d.v) of expected lifetime
utility of a worker of type θ, when he or she is not shirking, V w can then
be written as:
V
w = w − θe +
(1 − q)V w + qV u
(1 + r)
, (3)
3This assumption is made to simplify our analysis by reducing the margins along
which employers adjust. We could also think supervisory resources as based solely on
capital services (cameras for example), fact which could justify the exogenous price
of supervision. However, in one of the following sections we relax this assumption in
order to check if it is critical for our results.
4The choice of this probability of detection seems reasonable under the assumption
that supervision is based on labour services, but it can be also used in the case where
supervision is based on capital services denoting the capital per supervisee ratio. As
it is suggested by Odiorne (1963) the supervisory resources-to-staﬀ ratio is likely to be
highly correlated with the extent of employee monitoring. In our case the probability
of detection and the degree of monitoring intensity are tautosimous.
5If one in equation (1) was binding then the model specializes to the standard one
in the theory of the ￿rm.
9where V u is the p.d.v of expected lifetime utility of an unemployed
worker. Similarly, the p.d.v of expected lifetime utility of a shirker V sis
given by:
V
s = w +
(1 − P)(1 − q)V s +[ 1− (1 − P)(1 − q)]V u
(1 + r)
, (4)
Finally, the p.d.v of expected lifetime utility of an unemployed worker
V u, is given by the following equation:
V
u = ￿ +
sV w +( 1− s)V u
(1 + r)
, (5)
We are assuming that once a worker chooses to shirk he will always
s h i r k ,a n di fa nu n e m p l o y e dw o r k e r￿nds a job he will work rather than
shirk. A type θ worker will shirk unless the p.d.v of expected lifetime
utility of being a shirker is less than or equal to that of being a worker.
This is expressed by the following equation6:
V
w ≥ V
s, (6)
Combining (3), (4), (5)and (6)we obtain equation (7)
w ≥ ￿ + θe +
θe(r + s + q)
P(1 − q)
, (7)
Equation (7) is known as the non-shirking condition (NSC), and ex-
presses the set of all wages that prevent shirking for any given level of
e, ￿, θ, r, s, q and P.T h e ￿rm will be willing to pay the lowest pos-
sible wage associated with non-shirking of a worker of type θ.W e w i l l
assume that in case of indiﬀerence workers will choose to work rather
than shirk. Therefore, the NSC holds with equality. It is intuitive that
the non-shirking wage w will be higher, the higher the unemployment
bene￿t ￿, the interest rate r, the rehiring rate s,t h eq u i tr a t eq,t h e
more onerous the worker ￿nds putting forth eﬀort (the higher θ)a n dt h e
lower the probability of detection P. When workers are homogeneous
the NSC is used to determine the lower wage bound that prevents shirk-
ing (see following section). In this case workers are heterogeneous and
6In fact there is a continuum of such equations, arising by the continuity of the
parameter θ.
10we will assume that the employer pays a uniform wage7. Therefore, the
NSC cannot determine the lower wage that prevents shirking for each
worker, but instead of that it determines the marginal type of worker
who is indiﬀerent between shirking and non-shirking, at a given wage,
employment and supervision. Additionally, using equation (2), (7)and
the fact that each worker contributes one unit of eﬀort when he or she
works, we obtain equation (8):
θ
∗ =
N(1 − q)(w − ￿)
N(1 − q)+( r + s + q)L
, (8)
Equation (8)expresses the marginal type of worker θ
∗who will be in-
diﬀerent between shirking and working, at any diﬀerent value of wage,
employment and supervision. It is rather intuitive that workers with θ
less than θ
∗will choose to work. Because of our prior assumption that θ is
uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, the cumulative density function
of θ
∗will be F(θ
∗)=θ
∗. Using this property of the uniform distribution,
θ
∗determines the proportion of non-shirkers in the workforce. Because
we have assumed that a non-shirker￿s eﬀort is 1, θ
∗denotes also average
eﬀort. According to (8) the proportion of non-shirkers is increasing in
the wage and supervision and decreasing in the number of employees. In
other words, average eﬀort is positively related to the wage and monitor-
ing intensity expressed by the probability of detection. Thus the marginal
type of non-shirker, or average eﬀort or the proportion of non-shirkers
can be expressed as a function of the wage and monitoring intensity.
Hence (8)becomes :
θ
∗ = θ
∗(w,L,N), (9),w i t hθ
∗
w > 0, θ
∗
N > 0, θ
∗
L < 0, θ
∗
ww =0 ,
θ
∗
NN < 0, θ
∗
LL > 0, θ
∗
wL < 0, θ
∗
wN > 0, θ
∗
NL
<
>
0
It is rather intuitive that average eﬀort increases with the wage and
quantity of supervisory resources and decreases with the number of em-
ployees. Moreover, it is worth to try to interpret the sign of the cross
partial derivatives of average eﬀort w.r.t employment, supervision and
7If the ￿rm could pay diﬀerent wages to diﬀerent workers, and thus pay more
workers that are more inclined to shirk, this could be perceived as unfair by other
workers and thus this case would be vulnerable to moral hazard problems. Since the
￿rm cannot be a perfect discriminating monopsonist, there is no adverse selection
problem.
11the wage. The fact that θ
∗
wL is negative and θ
∗
wN is positive means that
the wage is more eﬀective in inducing workers to transit from shirking
to working when employment is higher, and supervision is held constant
and when supervision is higher and employment is held constant respec-
tively. Therefore, the average eﬀort is more responsive in the wage when
incentives are relatively better. Alternatively the wage is more eﬀec-
tive in enhancing employee￿s quality when employees are relatively more
motivated. The intuition behind this result is that more motivated em-
ployees (because for example of more stringent monitoring), are more
responsive in putting forth eﬀort, for the same wage increase, relative
to less intensively monitored employees because the probability of being
detected and dismissed is higher. On the other hand, given that it is
more likely for θ
∗
NLto be negative8 rather than positive9 and consider-
ing also the fact that θ
∗
wN is positive, we deduce that supervision is also
more eﬀective in inducing eﬀort when motivation is relatively higher.
This is quite surprising as one could think that the more supervision in-
creases, the more motivated is the workforce and thus the less responsive
is the proportion of non-shirkers to any wage change (this is the case in
Calvo-Wellisz model). In fact, most of the seminal eﬃciency wage models
(Shapiro-Stiglitz 1984) generate the results that eﬀort is more responsive
in incentive devices, when motivation is relatively lower. A possible ex-
planation of our ￿nding may be that, because θ
∗
NLis negative and θ
∗
wN is
positive, workers may not like supervision and that is why an increase in
supervision increases the negative eﬀe c to fa ne x t r ae m p l o y e eo na v e r a g e
eﬀort, given the wage, and also this is why a higher wage increases the
proportion of non-shirkers by more when supervision is higher, because
it is used to compensate workers for the extra supervision10.
8Note that θ
∗
NL > 0 ⇔
(1−q)
(r+s+q) > L
N.
9If θ
∗
NL > 0, this means that supervision is more eﬀective in inducing eﬀort when
motivation is relatively lower. Given, that θ
∗
wN > 0, θ
∗
wL < 0, which means that the
wage is more eﬀective in inducing eﬀort when motivation is higher, we would expect,
θ
∗
wN > 0 6= θ
∗
Nw < 0. Therefore, it is more intuitive, given this interpretation, for
θ
∗
NL < 0.
10In general, there are a lot of reasons why workers do not like supervision; ￿rstly
workers may perceive extra supervision as an intrusion in their activities or a sign
of distrust (Cowen-Glazer 1996, Chang-Lai 1999), or because they have to put more
eﬀort in the presence compared to the absence of supervision. However, there are
models which suggest that supervision decreases eﬀort (Fray 1993a,b), in our model
as it is an eﬃciency wage model this cannot happen. We just use that argument in
order to show that, if workers do not like supervision they will be more reluctant
123T h e F i r m
The employers decision problem is to choose the optimal combination
of the wage, employment and supervision in order to maximize pro￿ts
subject to the non-shirking condition. Since ￿rms cannot distinguish
between workers they recruit their employees from the labour force at
random. The typical ￿rm￿ s pro￿t maximization decision can be written
as:
max
w,L,N Π =m a x
w,L,N f[θ
∗(w,L,N)L] − wL− cN, (10)
where f[θ
∗(w,L,N)L], is the production function which is equivalent
to the real revenue function. Note that c stands for the exogenously
given price of supervisory resources, where we assume that c is suﬃciently
high, so the ￿rm cannot achieve perfect observability of eﬀort. We will
assume that the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale
in eﬃcient labour units( f
0 > 0, f
00 < 0)11.T h e ￿rst order conditions
associated with L, w and N are:
ΠL =[ θ
∗
L(w,L,N)L + θ
∗(w,L,N)] ∗ f
0
− w =0 , (11)
Πw =[ θ
∗
w(w,L,N) − 1] ∗ L ∗ f
0
=0 , (12)
ΠN =[ θ
∗
N(w,L,N)L] ∗ f
0
− c =0 , (13)
Equation (11)expresses the fact that in equilibrium the worker￿s wage
is equal to his/her net contribution in the ￿rm￿s revenue. An extra
employee increases revenue because of the extra eﬃcient labour units
but also decreases revenue because average eﬀort falls, when employment
increases marginally and everything else is kept constant. In order to
examine the eﬀect of the imposition of a binding minimum wage for
to increase eﬀort, when supervision is increased and that is why they will need a
compensating wage diﬀerential to increase their eﬀort relatively more (θ
∗
Nw > 0)a n d
also why an increase in employment will induce more people to transit from working
to shirking, when supervision is relatively higher (θ
∗
NL < 0).
11This seems quite reasonable as decreasing returns to eﬃcient labour units imply
diminishing marginal productivity of employment, supervision and wage as eﬃcient
labour units rise. It is intuitive to expect, the more eﬃcient is the labour force the less
the marginal contribution of the higher wage and supervision into output, through
higher motivation. Similarly, the more eﬃcient the labour force the less we expect an
increase in employment (in heads) to contribute to production.
13w o r k e r sw ew i l la s s u m et h a tt h ew a g ei sg i v e n 12.A sw ea r eu s i n gag e n e r a l
functional form for the production function, the model cannot be solved
explicitly. That is why we are going to use a graphical analysis for the
comparative statics results. Equations (11) and (13) are the equations
that determine the optimal L for any given w,a n dt h eo p t i m a lN,f o r
any given w and c respectively. Moreover, these equations can be used to
determine the loci of equilibrium L and N,i n( L, N)s p a c er e s p e c t i v e l y
and their intersection determines the equilibrium pair of L and N, for any
given wage. Consequently a change in the wage will shift both loci and
the optimal pair of L and N will change. In order to determine the eﬀect
of an exogenous increase in the wage of workers due to the imposition of
a minimum wage in the labour market where the typical ￿rm operates
we need to determine the slopes and the shifts of the equilibrium loci
of Land N13.L e t NN the locus of optimal supervisory resources for
any given wage of workers and supervisors and LL the locus of optimal
employment, for any given wage of workers. The direction (sign) of the
shifts and slopes of LLand NN loci depend on the signs of ΠLw , ΠNw
and ΠLN respectively14,w h i c ha r eg i v e nb y :
ΠLw =[ θ
∗
w(w,L,N) ∗ L][θ
∗
L(w,L,N) ∗ L + θ
∗(w,L,N)]f
00
+[θ
∗
Lw(w,L,N) ∗ L]f
0
+[ θ
∗
w(w,L,N)f
0
− 1], (14)
ΠNw =[ θ
∗
w(w,L,N)∗L][θ
∗
N(w,L,N)∗L]f
00
+[θ
∗
Nw(w,L,N)∗L]f
0
, (15)
ΠLN =[ θ
∗
N(w,L,N) ∗ L][θ
∗
L(w,L,N) ∗ L + θ
∗(w,L,N)]f
00
+[θ
∗
LN(w,L,N) ∗ L + θ
∗
N(w,L,N)]f
0
,(16)
12Under this environment, the only case under which the wage will be given is when
the wage is set exogenously (for example by government) above the equilibrium wage.
We need the wage to be given in order to do comparative statics and also we need the
condition for the equilibrium wage in order to see how the results are aﬀected when
this condition is violated.
13From the second order conditions(SOC) of pro￿t maximization, it can be derived
that, both ￿rst order conditions(FOC) for N and L slope downwards or upwards in
(L,N) space depending on the sign of ΠLN (The slopes are given by: ∂L
∂N|LL = −ΠLN
ΠLL
and ∂L
∂N|NN = −ΠNN
ΠNL). Again using the SOC we derive that, whatever is the sign of
ΠLN, the slope of the FOC for N is always steeper than the slope of the FOC for L
in (L,N) space. Additionally, the shifts of the locus of optimal L and the locus of
optimal N are given by: ∂L
∂w = −ΠLw
ΠLL and ∂N
∂w = − ΠNw
ΠNN respectively.
14From the SOC for pro￿t maximization we know that ΠLL and ΠNN are both
negative.
14it is easy to show that the ￿rst two terms in (16) are negative. As far
as for the third term is concerned, from (12) we get that θ
∗
w(w,L,N)f
0 −
1=0 , evaluated at the optimum. Therefore for a binding minimum
wage the last term in (16) is negative (zero, for a just binding minimum
wage) and therefore a higher wage decreases the marginal pro￿tability of
employment, given everything else, and thus employment must fall. This
simply means that LL locus will shift down, after the minimum wage
increase. In order to derive the ￿nal change in employment of workers
and supervisors, after the minimum wage increase, we need to check what
will be the change in supervision, as any change in supervision will aﬀect
employment of workers and vice verca. The ￿rst term in (15) is negative,
because of the diminishing marginal product of supervision in eﬃcient
labour units and re￿ects the standard eﬃciency wages prediction of a
trade-oﬀ between the wage and supervision, holding eﬀort unchanged
(i.e a higher wage, ceteris paribus, must cause a relaxation in monitoring
intensity and thus supervision falls). On the other hand, the second
term in (15) is positive, and expresses the fact that an increase in the
wage has also an increasing eﬀect on the marginal product of supervision,
everything else equal, because a higher wage increases the responsiveness
of average eﬀort in supervision (as it is shown in (8)) possibly because
after the wage increase it pays employers to increase eﬀort and eﬀort is
more responsive in an increase in supervision when the wage is relatively
h i g h e r .T h i si sa ni m p l i c a t i o no ft h ef a c tt h a tθ
∗
Nw is positive, i.e there
will be more intramarginal workers that transit from shirking to working,
for any wage increase, when the ￿rm employs relative more supervisors.
The eﬀect of a higher wage on the optimal quantity of supervisors will
depend on which of the two eﬀects dominates. The condition for the
change in the marginal product of supervision w.r.t to the wage is given
by equation (18):
ΠNw > 0 if and only if −
(θ
∗L) ∗ f
00
f
0 < 1, (17)
where −
(θ∗L)∗f
00
f
0 is evaluated at the optimum. The term −
(θ∗L)∗f
00
f
0
in (17) is similar to the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion,
in the sense that is a relative measure of the concavity of the produc-
tion or real revenue function in a neighborhood of the optimal wage. It
is rather intuitive why the direction of the shift of NN locus depends
on the concavity of the production function, evaluated at the optimum,
15since the concavity of the production function determines the diminish-
ing degree of the marginal product of supervision for a wage increase
above the equilibrium wage. Therefore, if the concavity of the produc-
tion function at the optimum is such that (17) i st r u e ,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h e
wage will increase the marginal product and thus the optimal quantity
of supervisors, holding everything else constant, suggesting that under
speci￿c conditions wage and supervision are complements in inducing
more eﬀort. If (17) is true, then NN locus shifts up if NN is negatively
sloped, and down if the slope of NN is positive. This ￿nding is not
against the standard shirking eﬃciency wage prediction that an increase
in the wage, in order to keep eﬀort unchanged must necessarily lead to a
decrease in supervision. Particularly, as (17) must always hold in equi-
librium, it becomes apparent that if the wage increases, ceteris paribus,
supervision falls. In our case, complementarity between the wage and su-
p e r v i s i o nm a ya r i s eb e c a u s e ,e v e nt h o u g ha f t e rt h ew a g ei n c r e a s e s ,e ﬀort
must remain in the maximum capacity level (e =1 ), employers adjust
optimally the proportion of non-shirkers. If it pays the ￿rm to increase
the proportion of non-shirkers, after the increase in the minimum wage,
then supervision will be increased, as we have already noted that when
t h ew a g ei sh i g h e r ,s u p e r v i s i o ni sm o r ee ﬀective in inducing average ef-
fort. This ￿nding suggests that, when eﬀort is binary and employers use
the wage and supervision to adjust also other qualitative characteristics
of workers, or when eﬀort is continuous (in this case average eﬀort θ
∗is
continuous), then it may be optimal for the employer, either to use the
wage and supervision as complements or as substitutes in providing in-
centives. Furthermore, by (16) we deduce that there are two opposite
eﬀects of a change in the quantity of supervision on the marginal revenue
product of labour. On the one hand an increase in supervision decreases
the marginal product of employment, as it is implied by the diminishing
returns exhibited by the production function in eﬃcient labour units.
The intuition for this result is that with more supervision the labour
f o r c ei sm o r ee ﬃcient and the same output can be produced by using
less employees in heads. The reduction in the number of employees will
enable the ￿rm to oﬀset some of the cost of a higher wage. On the other
hand, an extra supervisor increases monitoring intensity, as it increases
the probability of detection, decreases the propensity to shirk and thus
increases the marginal product of labour. Hence there is ambiguity for
the sign of ΠLN. Consequently, an increase in supervision, given every-
thing else constant may increase or decrease employment. Again this
16￿nding does not reverse the eﬃciency wage prediction that results from
the same rational as the wage-supervision trade oﬀ, i.e that an increase in
supervision in equilibrium, ceteris paribus, will increase employment15.I t
is again because of the continuity of the employees eﬃciency variable (θ
∗)
that employment and supervision may be either strategic complements
or substitutes. The ambiguity of the change in the marginal product of
employment if quantity of supervision changes will be resolved only if we
know which of the two eﬀects dominates. The sign of ΠLN is determined
by the following condition:
ΠLN > 0 if and only if −
(θ
∗L) ∗ f
00
f
0 < 216, (18)
again −
(θ∗L)∗f
00
f
0 is evaluated at the optimum. The sign of ΠLN depends
on the concavity of the production function in a right neighborhood of
the equilibrium wage, for the same reason as the sign of ΠwN.I f (18)
holds then both NN and LL loci slope upwards. Combining (17)and
(18),we obtain the following propositions.
Proposition 1 If the wage and supervision are complements in provid-
ing incentives, then employment and supervision are strategic comple-
ments .
Proposition 2 If employment and supervision are strategic substitutes,
then wage and supervision are substitutes in providing incentives
Proposition 3 If the wage and supervision are substitutes in providing
incentives, then employment and supervision may be either strategic sub-
stitutes or strategic complements.
15The same rational of the standard shirking eﬃciency wage model is used to predict
also that an increase in the wage, ceteris paribus, will increase employment. The
empirical analogue of this latter positive relationship between employment and the
wage is the employer size wage eﬀect (Brown-Medoﬀ 1989). Again, because of the
wage and employment change to adjust average eﬀort, we derive that, under our
environment an increase in the wage, ceteris paribus will decrease employment. Note
that this latter result is unambiguous.
16It is possible to show, as we will demonstrate it in the following analysis, that
there may exist a class of increasing and concave functions, that are widely used in
economics for which (18) and (19) hold for every value in the domain of the function.
Moreover, it is true that,
x∗f
00
f
0 =1⇐⇒ f(x)=γ logx, and that for any concave
transformation of f(x)=γ logx,
x∗f
00
f
0 > 1.
17The above propositions determine the 3 diﬀerent frameworks, under
which we will analyze the eﬀects of the imposition of a binding minimum
wage, when employers use the wage and supervision to provide incentives
and employees diﬀer in their innate aversion to exert eﬀort on the job. We
have just shown that when in general employee￿s performance variable is
continuous, it is ambiguous whether or not there is a trade-oﬀ between
the wage and supervision or if there is complementarity between employ-
ment and supervision or even if there exist a positive relationship between
wages and employer￿s size as the conventional shirking eﬃciency wage
model predicts. This may not be surprising but it has some important
empirical implications. Actually, we provide a theoretical explanation of
the fact that many empirical studies (Leonard 1987, Kruse 1992, Neal
1993) that attempted to identify the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ,i no r d e r
to check the validity of the predictions generated by the shirking eﬃciency
wage model, and do not control for eﬀort or determinants of employee￿s
performance, rendered inconclusive. Using, simple econometric intuition,
determinants of employee￿s performance, other than supervision (train-
ing, screening procedures etc.) are correlated with supervision and the
wage causing a bias to the estimate of the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ.
Other studies (Groshen-Krueger, 1990, Krueger, 1991, Rebitzer, 1995)
that try to identify causes of exogenous variation in supervision inten-
sity, in order to deal with the endogeneity problem generate results that
are consistent with the trade-oﬀ prediction.17 Finally, dividing (11) by
(13)we get:
N
L
=
v u u t(r + s + q)w
(1 − q)c
, (19)
From (19), it is apparent that an increase in the wage of production
workers, increases the intensity of monitoring, holding everything else
constant. However, monitoring intensity is enhanced by various ways,
that vary according to the relationship between inputs, as we will show
in the following sections. This implies, that it is optimal for the ￿rm after
the increase in the wage to increase average eﬀort or the proportion of
non-shirkers by increasing monitoring intensity. Moreover, it is intuitive
that the higher the exogenous propensity to shirk (the higher r, s, q)t h e
higher the optimal intensity of monitoring. By manipulating equation
17However, these studies were concerned with sources of the endogeneity of the
supervision proxy other than employees eﬀort.
18(19) we obtain :
w
c
=
(1 − q)N2
(r + s + q)L2, (20)
equation (20)implies that workers are paid less than supervisors18,a
￿nding which reconciles with evidence as well as conventional wisdom
and it is justi￿ed by the personnel literature argument that supervisors
a r el i k e l yt ob em o r ee ﬀective when they are paid more than the workers
they supervise, since pay symbolizes a worker￿s prestige and authority19.
3.1 Case 1
We have already proved that ΠLw is negative (LL shifts down)20,f o ra l l
changes in w. Suppose that proposition 1 is true, which means that ΠNL
is positive (LL and NN have positive slope) and ΠNw is also positive
(NN shifts down). The change in the equilibrium employment of work-
ers is illustrated in ￿gure 2. As it is indicated in the ￿gure, all changes
associated with increasing monitoring intensity (N rises L falls, N rises
more than L, N falls less than L), after the imposition of a binding
minimum wage, as suggested by (20)a r ep o s s i b l e .T h ee ﬀect of a higher
minimum wage on the optimal employment can be decomposed in two
distinct eﬀects (see appendix for proof). The one is the ￿direct￿ wage or
￿partial￿ wage eﬀect that decreases employment always as it is proved by
(14), for given supervision, and the other is the ￿supervision￿eﬀect, which
in this case is positive21. On the one hand, the higher wage, keeping su-
18We previously argued that θ
∗
LN < 0, which is equivalent to
(1−q)
(r+s+q) < L
N < ( L
N)2,
as L
N > 1, by the imperfect observability of eﬀort. Thus, as
(1−q)
(r+s+q) < ( L
N)2 ⇒ w
c < 1,
it is true that workers are paid less than supervisors.
19As Taylor (1959) puts it, ￿For a man to believe he is in truth ￿the boss,￿ he must
know he is receiving more pay that the men and women he supervises and, with few
exceptions, more than any employee in the operation who occupies a non-supervisory
job.￿
20Note that the marginal product of labour may rise or fall after the increase in
the minimum wage. It can be shown that the marginal product of labour increases if
and only if −
(θ∗L)∗f
00
f
0 < 1. This is also the condition for an increase in the marginal
product of supervision, after an increase in the wage. However, even if the marginal
product of labour increases, the marginal cost of labour (the wage here), increases
always by more and employment falls.
21The partial wage eﬀect, which is the shift of LL locus is given by ∂L
∂w = −ΠLw
ΠLL
, and thus sign( ∂L
∂w)=sign(ΠLw ),a sΠLL is always negative by the second order
conditions of pro￿t maximization. Similarly, the supervision eﬀect depends on the
19pervision constant, will decrease employment, but on the other hand the
higher wage will increase supervision, given everything else constant, and
more supervision, in this case increases employment, as we have assumed
that the necessary and suﬃcient condition (equation (17))f o rc o m p l e -
m e n t a r i t yo ft h ew a g ea n ds u p e r v i s i o na n de m p l o y m e n ta n ds u p e r v i s i o n
holds. Therefore under the above assumptions, the change in employ-
ment of covered workers depends on which of the two eﬀects dominates.
The ￿supervision￿ eﬀect is more likely to dominate the larger the shift of
the NN locus (the more sensitive is supervision in wage changes) and
the more steeply sloped is the locus of optimal employment LL at any
given wage(see appendix). Similarly, it can be shown that the eﬀect of a
higher wage on supervisory resources is decomposed into a ￿direct￿ wage
eﬀect, employment kept ￿xed and the so called ￿employment￿ eﬀect22.
Supervision increases, under this case, as a result of the higher wage, if
and only if the ￿partial￿ wage eﬀect dominates the ￿employment￿ eﬀect i.e
the higher the shift of NN (the more elastic is supervision w.r.t the wage,
given employment), the smaller the shift of LL( partial elasticity of em-
ployment w.r.t the wage) and the steeper the slope of NN in (L,N)space
(the smaller is the partial elasticity of supervision w.r.t employment). If,
we assume that supervision is ￿xed at the initial optimal choice level
and thus cannot adjust in an exogenous increase in the wage (perhaps
because it is based solely on capital services), then employment is de￿-
nitely decreased. This result is similar to Chung-Cheng Lin (1999) who
has shown that an increase in the minimum wage will decrease employ-
ment, in a labour market which is characterized by imperfect monitoring
and thus shirking problems, if workers are heterogeneous and supervi-
sory resources are ￿xed. Furthermore, Chung-Cheng Lin claimed that
if supervisory resources are ￿exible again employment will be decreased.
Their explanation for this conjecture is that, as long as the worker is
paid a wage that is equal to his marginal product, the monopsony result,
that employment will be increased for a modest increase in the wage can-
not be generated. We show that this may not be true, under this case.
In fact the result is ambiguous and depends on the magnitude of the
slope of LL locus and on the shift of NN locus(see appendix for proof) and is given
by: ∂L
∂N|LL ∗ ∂N
∂w =[ −ΠLN
ΠLL (− ΠNw
ΠNN] with sign( ∂L
∂N|LL ∗ ∂N
∂w )=sign(ΠNw ∗ ΠNL).
22The ￿direct￿ wage eﬀect on supervision is given by the shift of NN due to the
wage change which is given by: ∂N
∂w = − ΠNw
ΠNN. The employment eﬀect on supervision
is given by: 1
∂L
∂N |NN ∗ ∂L
∂w =( − ΠNL
ΠNN) ∗ (−ΠLw
ΠLL), and it depends on the inverse of the
slope of NN in (L,N) space and on the shift of LL due to the wage change.
20partial elasticity of employment w.r.t the wage(the partial wage eﬀect)
and the quantity of supervision respectively, and the partial elasticity of
supervisory resources w.r.t the wage(the product of the last two elastic-
ities consists the so-called ￿supervision￿ eﬀect). The employers problem
is essentially to choose the wage, employment and supervision to elicit
the optimal proportion of non-shirkers. As suggested by (20),a f t e rt h e
wage increase it pays the employer to increase monitoring intensity in
order to increase the proportion of non-shirkers. Monitoring intensity
is increased by three possible ways depending on the magnitudes of the
elasticities of employment and supervision w.r.t the wage and supervi-
sion w.r.t employment. For example under certain conditions, the ￿rm
may choose to ￿re workers and hire more supervisors. This is because,
initially with a higher wage the labour force is more eﬃcient and less
employees are needed to produce the same output. With less employees
the ￿rm needs less supervisors, but on the other hand the increase in the
wage, increases the marginal product of supervision by more than the
amount that would exactly oﬀset the negative employment eﬀect on su-
p e r v i s i o na n ds u p e r v i s i o nr i s e s .O nt h eo t h e rh a n dt h e￿rm may choose
to decrease both employment and supervision, because the higher wage
increases eﬃciency through motivation,but increases also the cost and
thus the ￿rm decreases both employment and supervision to decrease
the cost generated by the higher wage. Although, employment will fall
faster than supervision to keep eﬃciency high enough for pro￿tability.
Finally, the ￿rm may ￿nd optimal to increase both supervision and em-
ployment. The ￿rm is initially supply constrained as an extra worker
must be paid the given wage but also entails a monitoring cost. The
higher wage increases the marginal product of supervision and thus the
number of supervisors and because with more supervisors more workers
can be monitored, the number of workers increases. Note that in this
case we show that the number of supervisors is increasing by more than
the number of workers, because more workers reduce average eﬀort and
thus supervision must increase faster for eﬃciency of the workforce not
to be decreased. Consequently, the proportion of non-shirkers is higher
compared to the pre-minimum wage equilibrium state. An intuitive ex-
planation for that could be that an increase in the wage, although it
increases average eﬀort, everything else kept constant, it increases eﬀort
less that the amount that would compensate employers for the higher
wage.
213.2 Case 2
Let ΠNw being negative and ΠLN to be positive,(the state described by
proposition 2) to be the case. In other words, if the wage is increased
above the equilibrium level then supervision falls, everything else kept
constant. Similarly, if employment increases, given everything else con-
stant, supervision must rise. These are the standard predictions gener-
ated by the eﬃciency wage theory (trade-oﬀ between wage and supervi-
sion and complementarity between employment and supervision). The
change in the pair of equilibrium L and N,i sd e p i c t e di n￿gure 3. In
this case the result is unambiguous: an increase in the minimum wage
will decrease both employment of workers and supervisors. Under this
case, the wage and the ￿supervision￿ eﬀe c ta r em o v i n gt ot h es a m ed i -
rection (both are negative) and thus employment of covered workers will
decrease. Similarly, both the partial wage and the ￿employment￿ eﬀect
on supervision are negative and thus supervision falls. However, as we
proved in the previous section, monitoring intensity increases, under all
cases, which implies the optimal quantity of supervision is less elastic
w.r.t the wage in equilibrium, than optimal employment. The above
conditions (ΠNw < 0 and ΠLN > 0), hold in equilibrium also in Calvo-
Wellisz (1979)23. The diﬀerence between Calvo-Wellisz environment and
t h ec a s ew ea r ee x a m i n i n gi nt h i ss e c t i o ni st h a ti nt h e i rm o d e l ,p r o -
vided that the minimum wage is not set too high, employment increases
for an increase in the minimum wage, when supervision is held constant
23Calvo-Wellisz assume a two layer hierarchic organization, where employees in the
￿rst layer are production workers who are supervised by employees in the second
layer(supervisors), who in turn are supervised by the owner of the ￿rm. They further
prove that optimal arrangements in the ￿rst layer are independent of the layer above.
That is the reason why they solve the problem sequentially, by choosing optimally the
settings in the ￿rst layer, given arrangements in the layer above and then doing the
same in the second layer. This type of solution hinges on the trick that in the ￿rst layer
they set optimally the number of workers per supervisor and not the net number of
workers. Given the independence in optimal arrangements between hierarchic layers
they proceed and analyze the eﬀect of a higher wage in each layer independently. They
conclude that an increase in the minimum wage for production workers increases
the quantity and quality of workers and decreases that of supervisors. According
to their setting they actually derive that the number of employees per supervisor
(what we call the partial wage eﬀect) in the ￿rst layer increases, while the number
of supervisors remains the same (the supervision eﬀect), for a just binding minimum
wage. Therefore, there are two counteracting eﬀects on the net number of employees
in Calvo-Wellisz setting, even though their result does not change for a just binding
minimum wage because the supervision eﬀect is zero.
22(ΠLw > 0, i.e the partial wage eﬀect is positive, the LL locus shifts up)
(see ￿gure 4)24. Therefore, in Calvo-Wellisz there is a neighborhood of
the unconstrained wage, where the partial wage eﬀect and the supervi-
sion eﬀect are counteractive, and thus the employment eﬀect of a higher
minimum wage is ambiguous. Figure 4 presents the comparative statics
results for an increase in the minimum wage in the range where ΠLw is
positive. In Calvo-Wellisz, even though the quality of workers also ad-
justs to the minimum wage shock, the standard shirking eﬃciency wages
predictions hold and a decrease in the wage decreases monitoring in-
tensity, which can be done in three diﬀerent ways as indicated by the
￿gure. Calvo-Wellisz show that if the minimum wage is set in￿nitesi-
mally above the equilibrium wage, the supervision eﬀect is zero, which
suggests that the pro￿t maximizing wage is tautosimous with the su-
pervision maximizing wage and thus beyond this point supervision falls
and the supervision eﬀect becomes negative. Therefore employment in-
creases for an in￿nitesimal increase in the minimum wage because the
supervision eﬀect is zero and the ￿partial￿ wage eﬀect is positive. Al-
though it is easily deduced that, there exist a neighborhood beyond the
supervision maximizing wage, where employment increases, even though
the supervision eﬀect becomes negative, Calvo-Wellisz do not show that
it is possible in the range where ΠLw is positive, for the supervision eﬀect
to dominate and employment to fall. From the ￿gure we can deduce
that this is possible, i.e there is a neighborhood of the wage in the range,
where even though the partial wage eﬀect is positive (ΠLw > 0), the su-
pervision eﬀect (which is negative) dominates and both employment and
supervision fall. This result is quite important as it renders clear that
the range up to, one can increase the wage and increase employment, is
smaller in the case of ￿exible compared to the case of ￿xed supervisory
resources, in Calvo-Wellisz25. Finally, in Calvo-Wellisz it is not possi-
ble for both employment and supervision to increase, and thus the third
possible adjustment as suggested by the ￿gure cannot occur26.
24If the wage increase, due to the imposition of a minimum wage is suﬃciently high,
then ΠLw is negative also in Calvo-Wellisz and their predictions are exactly the same
generated under this case 2 of our model.
25Calvo and Wellisz proved that in the case of heterogeneous workers and ￿xed
supervisory resources employment increases for all wages set in the range where the
partial wage eﬀect is positive (as in this range the supervision eﬀect is zero, because
supervisory resources are ￿xed).
26Note that in ￿gure 3, we present a general treatment of the possible adjustments
of employment and supervision under heterogeneous workers and endogenous super-
233.3 Case 3
The ￿nal case arises when ΠNw and ΠLN are negative, which suggests
that the wage and supervision are substitutes in providing incentives (it
is optimal when the wage is increased exogenously for supervision to fall)
and employment and supervision are strategic substitutes, as it is stated
in proposition 3. Again as in case 1, the partial wage and supervision
eﬀects on employment, as well as the wage and employment eﬀect on
supervision are counteracting, leading to ambiguity of the eﬀect of the
imposition of a higher wage on the employment of workers and super-
visors. The possible adjustments are presented in ￿gure 5. The change
in optimal employment and supervision depends again on the signs and
magnitudes of the shifts of the loci and the relative slopes. Since, by
(19), we know that the increase in the wage increases the optimal moni-
toring intensity, the case that employment will rise and supervision will
fall is not possible to occur. Therefore, the only possible cases is for em-
ployment and supervision to fall after the minimum wage increase or for
employment to fall and supervision to rise. Therefore, under this case
a higher minimum wage will decrease employment of aﬀected workers.
Under this case, the negative partial wage eﬀect always dominates the su-
pervision eﬀect, which means that employment is relatively more elastic
in wage than in supervision changes and that supervision is not so elastic
in the wage changes. Furthermore, it is interesting to know whether or
not the magnitude of the wage increase is crucial in determining, which
out of the 3 cases is more likely to be true. It can be shown, that under
certain conditions for the production function, as the increase in the min-
imum wage above the equilibrium wage becomes higher, we move from
case 1 to case 2 and case 3 for a suﬃciently high increase in the min-
imum wage27. This prediction reconciles with conventional wisdom, as
visory resources. The result that the case of both employment and supervision rise,
is not possible, under Calvo-Wellisz environment, does not mean that this case is
always empty. Particularly, we believe, that this is not the case in Calvo-Wellisz be-
cause of the assumption of constant returns to scale in eﬃcient labour units which in
turn is the reasons why the pro￿t maximizing wage is tautosimous to the supervision
maximizing wage. Indeed, it can be shown that under increasing returns to scale in
production, both employment and supervision will increase in Calvo-Wellisz model.
27If −
(θ∗L)∗f
00
f
0 is increasing in the wage, then the higher the minimum wage increase
becomes we move from case 1 to case 3, given that the production function is such
that can give rise to all three cases.. It can be shown that the relative measure of the
concavity of the production function is increasing in the wage for any function with
24well as recent evidence (Card-Krueger 1995) i.e a suﬃciently high mini-
mum wage will decrease employment of covered workers. Although, if the
relative measure of the concavity of the production function is decreasing
in the wage, then for a suﬃciently high increase in the minimum wage,
case 1 arises, which means that it is possible, under certain conditions,
for total employment (supervisors plus supervises) to increase even after
a high increase in the minimum wage. In both case 1 and case 3, if certain
conditions are met, we may have the result that although employment of
covered workers decrease, employment of supervisors is increased. This,
may re￿ect the fact that for a high wage increase a cost minimizing ￿rm
will substitute high-skilled for low-skilled workers. As supervisors, are
normally on average more experienced, even in case where workers and
supervisors are relatively homogeneous and since our production function
allows for a non-zero elasticity of substitution between workers and su-
pervisors, this case may capture this fact28. Finally, as we have assumed
that the wage of supervisors is exogenous and that workers are paid less
than supervisors, it would be interesting to examine what will be the
eﬀect of an increase in the wage of supervisors because of a mandated
minimum wage. From (13), it is easy to show that if c increases exoge-
nously, the demand for supervision will fall, which means that the NN
locus will shift up29 in the case, where employment and supervision are
complements (ΠLN > 0), (see ￿gure 6) while the LL locus will not shift,
and thus supervision will fall. Given that employment and supervision
are complements the fall in supervision will cause a fall in employment.
Under case 3, where employment and supervision are substitutes, NN
locus shifts down, and while supervision falls employment increases, re-
￿ecting the fact of substitution of employees for supervisors(see ￿gure
7).
the property: (
f
000
f
00 −
f
00
f
0 )x>−1
28In fact in this case the elasticity of substitution is 0.5, which means that for any
two ￿red workers the ￿rm will hire one supervisor for output to remain unchanged.
Thus, in cases 1 and case 3, if employment falls and supervision rises total employ-
ment falls. This is another interesting ￿nding re￿ecting another problem that hinders
econometric studies of the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ. Any production function that
allows for a non-zero elasticity of substitution between employment and supervision
may produce a positive relationship between wages and supervision intensity, because
of a substitution eﬀect, that takes place after the wage increase(Groshen-Krueger
1990).
29The shift is given by ∂N
∂c = − ΠNc
ΠNN,a n dsign(∂N
∂c )=sign(ΠNc),w i t hsign(ΠNc)
being negative.
254A n E x a m p l e
In this section we adopt a speci￿c functional form for the production
function in order to derive the conditions under which total employment
increases or falls, after an exogenous increase in the minimum wage of
production workers in a labour market, where shirking is the eﬃciency
wage feature and employers use a combination of the wage and monitor-
ing intensity to prevent shirking. The production function is :
f[θ
∗(w,L,N)L]=( θ
∗L)
a, (21)
where a ∈ (0,1). We assume that the production function belongs
to this general class of increasing and concave in eﬃcient labour units,
functions. It can be shown,30 that for this class of functions, ΠNw > 0
and ΠLN > 0,f o ra l la ∈ (0,1)and for all (θ
∗L) ∈ <+,w h e r e<+ denotes
the set of all positive real numbers. Thus, our analysis is restricted in
our ￿rst case31. By combining (10), (11)and (13)we get:
N
∗(w)=L
∗(w)
s
Bw
Ac
, (22)
L
∗(w)=
a
1
1−a[Γ(w)]
1+a
1−a
w
1
1−a[Γ(w)+B]
1+a
1−a
(w − ￿)
a
1−a, (23)
where L∗and N∗ are the optimal quantity of workers and supervisors
respectively and A =( 1− q), B =( r + s + q) and Γ(w)=
q
ABw
c .T h e
change in equilibrium employment and supervision, when the wage of
workers is increased above the equilibrium level because of an increase
30Let f(x)=xa,w h e r ea ∈ (0,1) and x ∈ <+.T h e n −
x∗f
00
f
0 =1− a.T h u s ,
−
x∗f
00
f
0 < 1,t h u s(18) and (19) hold for all a ∈ (0,1) and all x ∈ <+.
31We mentioned in the previous sections that any concave transformation of f(x)=
γ logx, can give rise to the case where −
x∗f
00
f
0 > 1, for all x. Consider the composite
function g(x) = log(γ logx). For this function, we have that 1 < −
x∗f
00
f
0 < 2,f o r
x ∈ [e,+∞) and −
(θ∗L)∗f
00
f
0 > 2,f o rx ∈ [1,e). Therefore there is also an increasing
and concave function that can give rise to case 2 and 3 as well. In this case −
(θ
∗L)∗f
00
f
0
is decreasing in the wage, and thus for a suﬃciently high minimum wage case 2 is
the case, and therefore our result is consistent with conventional wisdom, that a
suﬃciently high minimum wage decreases employment of covered workers.
26in the minimum wage is given by diﬀerentiating both (22) and (23) w.r.t
the wage. Thus:
ηε =
1+a
1 − a
Φ +
1
1 − a
(aλ − 1), (24)
dN
dw
=
s
Bw
Ac
(
1
2
L
w
+
dL
dw
), (25)
where, ηε is the elasticity of labour demand for production workers
w.r.t the wage, Φ = Γ
0
(w)w( 1
Γ(w) − 1
Γ(w)+B)and λ = w
w−￿.B y (24) if
a → 0+ then ηε → Φ − 1 < 0 and if a → 1− then ηε → +∞.F r o m(25)
then and the fact
q
Bw
Ac > 0,w eg e tt h a t :
if ηε > 0,t h e n
dN
dw
> 0, (26)
if ηε < 0,t h e nsign of
dN
dw
= sign of (
1
2
L
w
+
dL
dw
), (27)
But
(
1
2
L
w
+
dL
dw
) > 0 ⇔ ηε > −
1
2
, (28)
It can be shown that Φ − 1 < −1
2, and thus it is possible for (28)
not to hold in our case in a right neighborhood of a =0 . which implies
that the total change in supervision w.r.t the wage may be also negative.
Thus, under this speci￿c environment all three subcases illustrated in ￿g-
ure 2, are possible. Moreover because lima→1− ηε =+ ∞,t h e r ei sal e f t
neighborhood of a,w h e r eηε is positive and because lima→0+ ηε = Φ− 1,
there is a right neighborhood of a where ηε is negative, there will be
a value of a, such that ηε(a)=0 . U s i n gt h es a m ea r g u m e n tw ec a n
show that there exists a value of a such that ηε(a)=−1
2.T h e s i g n s
of the change in employment of workers and supervisors along diﬀer-
ent subintervals of values of a, are given in table 1. Employers decision
problem is to choose employment of workers and supervision in order to
elicit the optimal amount of non-shirkers or average eﬀort θ
∗, for any
given wage. The increase in the minimum wage will increase average
eﬀort, given everything else constant, by the change in the FOC we can
deduce that the increase in average eﬀort is less than the optimal in-
crease, therefore, monitoring intensity must be increased, which means
that employment may be decreased for given supervision and supervi-
sion must be increased for given employment. We show that, under this
27speci￿c example which is captured by general case 1, if labour demand
for production workers is very negatively elastic (ηε < −1
2), then the
￿employment￿ eﬀect dominates the ￿wage￿ eﬀect on supervision and su-
pervision falls, but less than employment (see table 1). On the other
hand, at the range of a where −1
2 < ηε < 0, employment falls but the
increasing eﬀect of the higher wage on supervision exceeds the decreas-
ing eﬀect of lower employment of workers on supervision and supervision
rises. Finally, there is a left neighborhood of a =1where supervision
is very (positively) elastic in the wage and the elasticity of employment
w.r.t the quantity of supervisors is such that the ￿supervision￿ eﬀect on
employment exceeds the (negative) elasticity of employment of workers
w.r.t the wage ( the ￿partial￿ wage eﬀect), and thus employment of cov-
ered workers as well as total employment (workers plus supervisors) rise.
Although, in this latter case employment rises by less than supervision
after the minimum wage increase. This is because, under case 1 the em-
ployer must increase monitoring intensity after the minimum wage rises
and thus in each subcase of case 1, the changes in L and N may be such
that the probability of detection rises after the minimum wage shock. In
table 1, it is indicated that for a = a0, we get Lin￿s result, i.e employ-
ment falls and supervisory resources are ￿xed. It is apparent by table 1
that the eﬀect of the minimum wage on the employment of workers and
supervisors depends on the value of the parameter a.I n t h i s c a s e a is
an indicator of the degree of the diminishing returns to scale exhibited
by the production function. As atends to one the returns to scale tend
to be constant, and given that −
(θ∗L)∗f
00
f
0 =1− a, the measure of the
concavity tends to zero, the positive ΠNw (and therefore the wage eﬀect
on supervision) is maximized, supervision rises and also it rises in a way
such that the supervision eﬀect dominates the wage eﬀect on employ-
ment (ΠLw < 0) which leads also employment to increase. On the other
hand, when a → 1,b y(17)we get that ΠNw → 0,t h ew a g ee ﬀect on
supervision tends to zero, thus the employment eﬀect which is negative
dominates and supervision falls (this case is the case where the fall in
supervision is maximized). In the one polar case, of constant returns to
scale(a =1 )i ne ﬃcient labour units, both supervision and employment
increase in contrast with Calvo-Wellisz, where with constant returns to
scale supervision falls and employment increases for a marginal increase
in the wage. In the other polar case(a =0 ) where the production func-
tion approaches a constant(in fact it approaches one!), both employment
and supervision fall. Consequently, the degree of the decreasing returns
28to scale exhibited by the production function is a critical condition for
results generated not only because it is the criterion which we use in
order to identify which case, out of the three arises, but also because it
aﬀects results within cases (here, within case 1). Therefore, by using an
example, in which the production function belongs to a general class of
functions widely used in economics and thus we can solve the model ex-
plicitly, we derive the conditions under which each diﬀerent adjustment
of monitoring intensity can be the case. We show that all adjustments
are possible and that because of this, it is possible for an increase in the
minimum wage to increase both employment and supervision, or to de-
crease both or decrease employment and increase supervision, although
it is discussed that in the latter case total employment falls.
5 The case of homogeneous workers
In this section we are considering a special case that arises in our model
when workers are homogeneous (θ
∗ =1 ) in order to test the robustness of
our predictions in the generalized setting32. Under workers homogeneity
the problem becomes:
max
w,L,N Π =m a x
w,L,N f(L) − wL − cN (29)
s.t w = ￿ + e +
e(r + s + q)
N
L (1 − q)
(30)
Equation (30) can be used to express supervisory resources as a function
of employment and the wage;
N(w,L)=
Le(r + s + q)
(1 − q)(w − ￿ − e))
(31)
with Nw < 0, NL > 0, Nww > 0 and NLw < 0. From the sign of these
partial derivatives it is unambiguous that, in equilibrium, there is a wage-
supervision trade-oﬀ and a complementarity between supervision and the
wage. If we further substitute (31) into (29), then the maximization
problem becomes;
max
w,L Π =m a x
w,L f(L) − wL− cN(w,L) (32)
32This case may also represent a special case of the model with heterogeneous
workers, when the constraint on θ
∗ is binding(recall that θ
∗ ≤ 1). In the previous
section we implicitly assume that is non-binding.
29The ￿rst order conditions for pro￿t maximization are given by the fol-
lowing equations:
ΠL =0⇒ fL = w + cNL = 0 (33)
Πw =0⇒−
cNw
L
= 1 (34)
Equation (33) expresses the fact that in equilibrium the marginal
revenue product of labour exceeds the wage. In fact the marginal cost of
labour has two components, the wage and the marginal monitoring cost
of employment, which is decreasing in the wage. The marginal revenue
product of labour exceeds the wage suggesting that the ￿rm has some
monopsony power, arising from the upward sloping relationship between
the wage and employment from the non-shirking condition. Equation
(34)denotes the standard Solow condition: the wage is chosen to minimize
the average cost of labour. This is because a higher wage has as a result
to increase average cost but on the other hand it also decreases average
labour cost as it decreases the average monitoring cost, because of the
wage-supervision trade-oﬀ. In equilibrium the wage increase is exactly
oﬀset by the decrease in the average monitoring cost of employment. The
change in employment after the introduction of a binding minimum wage
is given if we totally diﬀerentiate equation (32):
dL
dw
= −
ΠLw
ΠLL
(35)
where ΠLL the own second order partial derivative of the pro￿t function
w.r.t employment, and ΠLw is the cross partial derivative of the pro￿t
function. Therefore
sign
dL
dw
= signΠLw (36)
Where ΠLw is given by:
ΠLw = −1 − cNwL(37)
by (34)and the fact that cNLw = cNw
L , we obtain that employment
does not change, after the imposition of a just binding minimum wage(ΠLw =
300).33 This implies that the pro￿t maximizing wage is the employment
maximizing wage34. Alternatively, a higher wage, on the one hand in-
creases the marginal cost of labour but on the other hand it decreases the
marginal monitoring cost of labour, as it increases motivation and thus
monitoring intensity can be relaxed. In this case, the increase in the wage
is exactly oﬀset by a decrease in the marginal monitoring cost and the
increase in the minimum wage has no eﬀect on employment. However,
it is easily deduced that any non-in￿nitesimal increase in the wage will
decrease employment. On the other hand, pro￿ts fall because a binding
minimum wage increases the average cost of labour, as the increase in
the wage is less than oﬀset by the fall in the average monitoring cost of
labour, as it can be understood by (34). Moreover, it can be also shown
that supervisory resources fall for a just binding minimum wage. In fact
the eﬀect of an exogenously set higher wage on supervision is calculated
using (31)and is given by:
dN
dw
=
∂N
∂w
+
∂N
∂L
dL
dw
(38)
Under homogeneous workers, and binary eﬀort and as it is also sug-
gested by (31) the standard eﬃciency wages predictions hold, i.e there is
at r a d e - o ﬀ between supervision and the wage (∂N
∂w > 0), there is strate-
gic complementarity between employment and supervision (∂N
∂L > 0)a n d
also there is the positive so called ￿employer-size￿ wage eﬀect(∂L
∂w > 0).
Therefore, once more the total eﬀect of a higher wage on supervisory re-
sources has two components, as in the case of heterogeneous workers (but
the signs of the eﬀects are diﬀerent in this case): the one component is
the eﬀect of a higher wage on supervision for given employment, which is
negative as wage and supervision incentives are substitutes. On the other
hand there is the employment eﬀect, which is positive as employment and
33In general, in the optimal employment decision of the ￿rm is given by an equation
of the form: ΠL = RL−CL =0 ,w h e r eRL stands for the marginal revenue product of
labour and CL stands for the marginal cost of labour. Moreover, we have shown that
the change in employment is given by equation (35),w i t hsignΠLw = sign(RLw −
CLw)=sign(RLw
w
RL−CLw
w
CL)=sign(ER
w−EC
w), the change in employment depends
on whether or not in equilibrium the elasticity of the marginal revenue product of
labour w.r.t the wage (EL
w) exceeds the elasticity of the marginal cost of labour w.r.t
t h ew a g e( EL
w).
34If the supervision cost function is convex in the quantity of supervisory resources,
it can be shown that employment increases and supervision falls for a just binding
minimum wage.
31supervision are strategic complements. In this case the ￿employment￿ ef-
fect on supervision is zero as dL
dw =0 , for a just binding minimum wage,
implying that supervision decreases for a just binding minimum wage and
decreases by more for larger wage increases. Another interesting result is
that, since there is an employment maximizing wage35,t h ew a g ee m p l o y -
ment relationship is backward bending in the (w,L)s p a c e( o rc o n c a v e
function of the wage and exhibits a maximum).36 Additionally, it can be
shown that, if there is a wage where supervision is maximized w.r.t the
wage then this wage is non-binding, which further implies that a wage
for which both employment and supervision increase is non-binding. In
general, a higher wage increases motivation and leads to a relaxation in
monitoring intensity. Lower monitoring intensity essentially means less
supervisors per employee or more workers per supervisor. This can be
achieved if both the number of supervisors and employees decrease but
the decrease is higher for supervisors or both supervisors and workers
increase but the increase in the number of workers is higher or even
if the number of employees increases and that of supervisors declines37
(there is also the polar case of employment to remain unchanged and su-
p e r v i s i o nt of a l lo rs u p e r v i s i o nt or e m a i nu n c h a n g e da n de m p l o y m e n tt o
rise, with the latter not being possible as we discussed above). We show
that, when the minimum wage is set in￿nitesimally above the equilibrium
wage one of the polar case arises. Furthermore, it is also shown that the
￿rm will never choose, to increase both employment and supervision or
increase employment and decrease supervision, as optimal adjustments
of the monitoring intensity, for a binding minimum wage. It is intuitive
why the former adjustment cannot take place for a binding minimum
wage, as pro￿ts fall and the ￿rm will try to save resources somehow, it
is not possible to increase inputs and save resources, in this case. Alter-
natively, if we used (30) to substitute for L as a function of w and N,
and thus solve the maximization problem and do the comparative statics
35It has been shown that, dL
dw|w=w∗ =0 .U s i n gt h es a m ep r o c e d u r e ,w eh a v et h a t :
for w>w ∗, ΠLw < 0 ⇒ dL
dw|w>w∗ < 0,a n df o rw<w ∗, ΠLw > 0 ⇒ dL
dw|w>w∗ > 0.
Suggesting that w∗ is the employment maximizing wage, in this case.
36The concept of labour demand is not well de￿ned for wages below the eﬃciency
wage as no ￿rm would ever choose such a wage. Blanchard and Summers (1988)
suggest that models with upward-sloping labor demand curves may be useful in
macroeconomics.
37From equation (30) NSC we get that
d( N
L )
dw < 0. Which implies that EN
w <E L
w,
where EN
w and EL
w is the elasticity of supervisory resources w.r.t the wage and the
elasticity of employment w.r.t the wage respectively.
32for N, and then use the NSC to do the comparative statics for L,t h e
results will be exactly the same. Using this way to treat the problem,
the change in optimal L can be expressed by :
dL
dw
=
∂L
∂w
+
∂L
∂N
dN
dw
,(39)
The ￿rst term is the eﬀect of a higher wage on employment for given
supervisory resources( the employer size wage eﬀect or the partial wage
eﬀect), which is clearly positive. A higher wage increases incentives and
thus monitoring can be relaxed. For given supervisory resources, moni-
toring is relaxed by increasing employment. The second term expresses
the supervision eﬀect of a higher wage and is negative because a higher
wage decreases supervision and less supervisors will lead to less employ-
ees as supervision and employment are strategic complements. We have
shown above that for a just binding minimum wage the total employment
eﬀect is zero, which means that the partial wage eﬀect is equal in absolute
value to the supervision eﬀect. In general, if we assume that supervisory
resources are held ￿xed to the initial optimal level and that they cannot
adjust instantaneously to any exogenous shock (perhaps because supervi-
sion is solely based on capital services), the negative term in (39)vanishes
and thus the employment eﬀect is positive. However, the positive em-
ployment eﬀect is local, as one cannot increase the wage without limit
and increase employment. Moreover, by (39) it also becomes clear why
the range up to which one can increase the wage and increase employ-
ment is greater in the case of ￿x e dt h a ni nt h ec a s eo f￿exible supervisory
resources, which it was also shown that it holds under heterogeneity of
workers. Therefore, we show that although the employment eﬀect of a
higher minimum wage is positive, when supervision is ￿xed, the positive
employment eﬀect doesn￿t persist when supervision is endogenized. This
last ￿nding, shows that the result of Rebitzer and Taylor(1995), which
is widely cited in the minimum wage literature, that an increase in the
minimum wage in a shirking eﬃciency wages environment, where workers
are homogeneous, will increase employment, hinges heavily on the ￿xity
of supervisory resources. This ￿nding is important, as in the real world,
except of few cases where supervision is exogenously regulated by govern-
ment or other institutions38, the employment of supervisory resources is
38In the USA, in the hospital industry the supervisor to staﬀ ratio is often regu-
lated by the state or federal government (Groshen-Krueger 1990). Moreover, in some
industries, safety regulations may impose a ￿xed supervisor to staﬀ ratio for some
professions(Rebitzer 1995).
33ac h o i c eo ft h e￿rm. Hence, we show that by accounting for more realis-
tic features of the low-wage labour market more accurate predictions can
be generated. Under workers heterogeneity the employment eﬀect of a
higher minimum wage is ambiguous and it can be positive in some cases
and negative in some other, while with homogeneous workers the predic-
tion is more clear, as employment of covered workers remains unchanged
or decreases. The predictions we generate seem to reconcile with the
recent evidence (Card-Krueger 1995, Brown 1999), that point towards to
zero or small positive or negative estimates of minimum wage employ-
ment elasticities. We further believe that, our latter result is empirically
relevant as it may also provide another theoretical explanation, particu-
larly of the evidence from the fast food studies in the US (Card-Krueger
1994, Katz and Krueger 1992), where employment increased in low-wage
restaurants compared to high wage restaurants in the same state, after
the increase in the minimum wage. There is evidence (Card-Krueger
1995), that in fast food industry high-wage restaurants are larger in size
compared to low-wage restaurants. As the fast food industry is com-
petitive, non-unionized and workers are relatively homogeneous(Krueger
1991), monitoring problems may consist a very good explanation of the
p o s i t i v ee m p l o y e r - s i z ew a g ee ﬀect39. If it is true that small establish-
ments pay lower wages and thus their employees are less motivated than
in larger restaurants, then we would expect an increase in the wage to
increase motivation by more in small, low-wage restaurants compared to
high wage restaurants. This would mean that monitoring intensity will
be relaxed by more in low-wage restaurants, and thus for given super-
vision, employment will be increased by more, compared to high-wage
establishments. This, simply means that the ￿rst term in (39)is higher
for low wage than for high-wage restaurants.40 Similarly, given that high-
wage restaurants are larger in size, monitoring diﬃculties will be more
signi￿cant in these restaurants. Given this argument, employment will
be more elastic in a change in supervision in high-wage compared to low-
wage restaurants, because a marginal fall in supervision, induces even
more monitoring diﬃculty in large establishments, and given the wage,
39Other potential explanations as the threat arising from unionization, market
power and heterogeneity of workforce are dismissed.
40The ￿rst term in equation (39) is the change in employment, when supervision is
held constant, for an increase in the wage, for given level of eﬀort and motivation. The
higher the increase in incentives, after the wage change, the more monitoring intensity
must be relaxed to keep eﬀort ￿xed and thus, the more employment increases for given
supervision.
34employment must fall by more, for detection problems to be mitigated.
Thus, the ￿rst term from the left in the second part of (39) is smaller
in absolute value in low-wage compared to high-wage restaurants. Fi-
nally, we believe that a change in the wage, will induce smaller changes
in supervision in a small establishment compared to high-wage, mainly
because of the physical structure of the fast-food restaurants.41This im-
plies that also the second term in the second part of (39) is smaller in
absolute value for low-wage restaurants. Consequently, our theoretical
analysis in this section, as summarized by equation (39)which re￿ects the
standard decomposition of the employment eﬀect of a higher wage into
the partial wage and to the supervision eﬀect, could possibly explain the
relative employment gains in the fast food restaurants in the Texas and
New-Jersey-Pennsylvania studies, as estimated by Katz-Krueger(1992)
and Card-Krueger(1994) respectively. Finally, as our latter discussion
points out, ￿ndings in the fast-food industry can be rationalized using
a sab a s i sas h i r k i n ge ﬃciency wage framework, the validity of our initial
perception that our shirking model may capture some major features of
some low-wage labour markets is enhanced.
6E x t e n s i o n s a n d V a r i a n t s
In this section, we relax the assumption that the price of supervisory re-
sources is exogenous and independent of the wage of workers, in order to
check the validity of our previous results but also in order to oﬀer some
alternative treatment of the problem. We, will assume that supervision
is based solely on labour services and that the ￿rm employs homoge-
neous workers who are randomly allocated across tasks (production and
supervision). Therefore, the assumption we made for the workers side in
the previous sections, hold in this section also for supervisors. There is
imperfect observability of workers￿ eﬀort and that is why the employer
41A small fast food restaurant will probably use a supervisor in the kitchen to su-
pervise employees that prepare the food and probably one in the cash-registers. Given
this structure, it is quite hard, to imagine, given the limited space, that any change
in the wage that will motivate employees will induce any changes in the supervision
of a small restaurant. Because of this argument, we expect supervision to be rela-
tively ￿xed in low-wage restaurants and quite ￿exible in high-wage establishments.
Given, this last argument and our previous results that the employment eﬀect of a
higher wage is exaggerated, under ￿xed supervision, it is easy to understand why
employment increased in low-wage relative to high-wage restaurants in New-Jersey
and Texas.
35hires supervisors to monitor employees, and he, in turns monitor super-
visors. Let, the employer to have unitary supervisory capacity. Then the
probability of detection or monitoring intensity of supervisors eﬀort is
given by the following equation:
Q =m i n [
1
N
,1], (40)
while the probability of detection of workers is, under this case given
by:
P =m i n [
eN
L
,1], (41)
if supervisors shirk (e =0 ), then it becomes impossible to detect shirking
workers and an in￿nite wage must be paid to workers in order to prevent
shirking. Therefore, if supervisors shirk, workers will shirk, and the ￿rm
generates losses. The employer must decide the optimal combination
of carrots (wages) and sticks(dismissal threats based on supervision) to
prevent shirking in production and supervision. We are interested for the
case, where one in equations (40) and (41)is non-binding. Furthermore,
if we follow the standard procedure in order to derive the worker￿s and
the supervisor￿s decision making condition and given that the industry
in which the ￿rm operates is covered by a minimum wage, the employer
solves the following problem:
max
w,c,L,N f(L) − wL− cN, (42)
s.t w = ￿ + e +
e(r + s + q)
(1 − q)P
, (42)
c = ￿ + e +
e(r + s + q)
(1 − q)Q
, (43)
w ≥ wm, (44)
c ≥ wm, (45)
From (42) and (43), it is implied that homogeneous workers that are
allocated in diﬀerent tasks, which we will assume that are equally diﬃ-
cult, may receive diﬀerent wages. The wage diﬀerential depends on the
monitoring diﬃculty. As neoclassical economics postulate that any wage
diﬀerential must be attributed in diﬀerences in workers characteristics or
working conditions, this result may provide an explanation of why the ev-
idence that interindustry wage diﬀerentials cannot be explained solely by
36the neoclassical reasoning (Krueger-Summers, 1988). The ￿rm chooses
the cost minimizing wages and thus the minimum wage constraints are
both binding and (42) and (43) are equivalent to:
wm = ￿ + e +
e(r + s + q)L
(1 − q)N
, (46)
wm = ￿ + e +
e(r + s + q)N
(1 − q)
, (47)
By (46) and (47) we conclude that the cost minimizing ￿rm will pay the
same wages to workers and supervisors and supervise them by the same
stringency, P = Q or N
L = 1
N. The model can be solved descriptively, as
by (46)and (47), an increase in the minimum wage, ￿rstly increases em-
ployment of supervisors, and since employment of workers is increasing
in both quantity of supervisors and the wage, it increases employment of
workers as well. This is another way to derive a result that it is also pos-
sible, if certain conditions hold, in the ￿rst case of heterogeneous workers,
analysed in the previous sections, but with homogeneous workers42.T h i s
result seems rather intuitive: because of the ￿xed supervisory capacity, if
the ￿rm wants to hire more supervisors it must pay a higher wage. The
constant capacity to supervise supervisors, lead the ￿rm to employee less
supervisors, and thus leads to a lower probability of detection of shirking
workers. Consequently the ￿rm is supply constraint in terms of super-
visors and for this reason is supply constraint in terms of workers as
well. An increase in the minimum wage enables the supply constraint
￿rm to employ more supervisors and thus more workers, leading to an
increase in total employment. The problem becomes slightly diﬀerent
if initially there is no binding minimum wage constraint and employers
choose wages optimally. We will analyze the eﬀect of a higher minimum
wage ￿rstly for production workers and then for supervisors, under this
framework. Solving (42) for N, plugging that in (43)and solve for c and
use both constraints to substitute in the objective function for N and c
as functions of w and L the ￿rst order conditions are:
ΠL = fL − w − cNNLN − cNL =0 , (48)
42The relaxation of the assumption of ￿xed wage of supervisors, under heteroge-
neous workers does not change the results, compared to the previous analysis of the
three diﬀerent cases that arise, under heterogeneity of workforce, but makes the alge-
bra messier.
37Πw = −L − cNNwN − cNw =0 , (49)
if a minimum wage for production workers is introduced, just above the
optimal wage for employees, then the direction of the change in employ-
ment of workers will be given, as explained previously by the sign of
ΠLw. Manipulating, (48)and using the fact that equation (49),h o l d si f
the minimum wage is set in￿nitesimally above the wage of production
workers, we get :
ΠLw = −2cNNLNw > 0, (50)
Therefore, by (50) employment of workers increases, after the imposi-
tion of a just binding minimum wage for production workers. It is also
shown (see appendix), that if the production function exhibits constant
returns to scale in the labour input, the quantity of supervisors remains
unchanged, i.e the pro￿t maximizing wage is the supervision maximizing
wage. This result is quite important, as we essentially show that under
a very similar environment as in Calvo-Wellisz(1979) and mainly by as-
suming constant returns to scale, a just binding minimum wage increases
employment and does not aﬀect supervision. This result is identical with
Calvo-Wellisz, even though we assume that workers are homogeneous,
suggesting that Calvo-Wellisz result is mainly driven from their assump-
tion of constant returns to scale in eﬃcient labour units. The explanation
is again the same as we discussed in case 2 in the previous section: there
is also here a wage range above the equilibrium wage, where an increase
in the wage, given everything else, increases employment (the partial
wage eﬀect is positive) and for a just binding minimum wage the super-
vision eﬀect is zero, the wage of supervisors remains also constant and
therefore the total employment eﬀect is positive. The most important
implication of this latter result is that under the most complex variant
of Calvo-Wellisz model, where workers are heterogeneous and supervi-
sory resources are endogenous, if one relaxes the assumption of constant
returns to scale and instead assumes decreasing returns to scale the im-
position of a just binding minimum wage has no more a positive eﬀect on
the employment of covered workers and the eﬀect becomes ambiguous.
However, the eﬀect remains positive in Calvo-Wellisz when workers are
homogeneous, suggesting that also heterogeneity of workforce moderates
the employment eﬀect of a higher minimum wage. Assuming constant
returns to scale, is critical in generating a zero total wage eﬀect on super-
vision and thus a positive employment eﬀect in the case of heterogeneous
workers. If, on the other hand the wage of supervisors is increased be-
38cause of the introduction of a minimum wage then, both employment of
s u p e r v i s o r sa n dw o r k e r sr i s ea sw e l la st h ew a g eo fw o r k e r s . T h ei n t u -
ition is similar, as in the case of this section, where the minimum wage
is a binding constraint for both workers and supervisors. Finally, we
show that, if the assumption of the ￿xed wage for supervisors is relaxed,
the eﬀect of a higher wage on employment is positive, for a just binding
minimum wage and is negative for a suﬃciently high minimum wage,
as beyond the neighborhood of the optimal wage the supervision eﬀect
becomes signi￿cantly negative and employment falls. This suggest, that
Rebitzer and Taylor(1995) ￿nding, that a higher minimum wage increases
employment of covered workers, under ￿xed supervision, does not change
neither in sign, nor in magnitude, under endogenous supervision, if the
production function exhibits constant returns to scale, for a just bind-
ing minimum wage and supervisors are similar to workers in their innate
propensity to shirk. However, the range up to which one can increase the
wage and increase employment is shorter, if the supervision choice is en-
dogenous. If the production function is a standard increasing and concave
function of labour input, then a just binding minimum wage decreases
supervision, and the positive employment eﬀect of a higher minimum
wage is more pronounced under ￿xed supervisory resources, compared to
the case where the choice of supervision becomes endogenous. Finally, if
t h e r ee x i s ts o m ev a l u e so ft h ee x o g e n o u sp a r a m e t e r s( r, s, q), for which in
equilibrium θ
∗ =1 , then for these values the homogeneous workers case
is equivalent to a special case of heterogeneous workers. Therefore, the
case with homogeneous workers, where supervisory resources are ￿xed
(the Rebitzer-Taylor case), under certain conditions, may produce the
same predictions as if workers have been assumed to be heterogeneous.
Combining this latter result with the result which is predicted by Calvo
and Wellisz, under particular conditions, that a just binding minimum
wage increases employment of covered workers, under ￿xity of supervi-
sion, when workers are heterogeneous, we refute the result of Lin(1999),
that with heterogeneous workers and ￿xed supervisory resources employ-
ment of covered workers, necessarily falls, after a minimum wage increase.
7 Conclusions
There is evidence from low-wage industries (Krueger-Summers 1987),
where the minimum wage is particularly binding, that gives rise to eﬃ-
39ciency wages considerations. Particularly, more evidence(Brown-Medoﬀ
1989, Krueger 1991), provide further support to the shirking version of
eﬃciency wages. Therefore, we believe that eﬃciency wages models that
try to predict the employment eﬀect of a binding minimum wage, may
be particularly relevant in some low-wage industries. On the other hand,
theoretical work on the employment eﬀects of a higher minimum wage,
under eﬃciency wage considerations seems incomplete, as the existing
seminal models do not capture some important features of the low-wage
labour market (endogeneity of supervisory resources, imperfect informa-
tion about the workers genetic characteristics etc.) and some of their
results may hinge heavily on the environment assumed. Calvo-Wellisz
(1979), ￿rst examined the eﬀects of a binding minimum wage for pro-
duction workers employed by a competitive hierarchic ￿rm in an asym-
metric information environment, where the management of human re-
sources within ￿rms involves a ￿game￿ between employees who seek to
maximize utility and residual owners whose aim is to maximize prof-
its and who resort to incentives and punishments to achieve their goal.
Calvo-Wellisz concluded that under this kind of environment, an increase
in the minimum wage will increase quantity of covered workers and de-
crease quantity of supervisors. Although, Calvo-Wellisz devote a minor
part of their analysis in predicting the eﬀects of the imposition of a bind-
ing minimum wage, under their environment and thus we believe that
there are some gaps for further research on the shirking approach of the
eﬀects of minimum wages on employment. More recently Rebitzer-Taylor
(1995), oﬀered a theoretical explanation of the positive eﬀect of the in-
crease in the minimum wage on employment, that identi￿ed in recent
studies (Card and Krueger 1995), suggesting that monopsony may arise
by imperfect monitoring. However, Lin (1999) after extending Rebitzer
and Taylor work to account for heterogeneity of workforce generated the
standard neoclassical result of the increase in the minimum wage, sug-
gesting that his ￿ndings cast doubt on the validity of Rebitzer and Taylor
results, which seem to hinge on a number of simpli￿ed assumptions, as
homogeneity of workforce and ￿xity of supervisory resources. Finally,
Manning (1995) also presents an eﬃciency wages treatment of the eﬀects
of an exogenous increase in the wage on employment, in an environment
where employees diﬀer in their valuation of leisure and employers have
full information about worker￿s type. Manning￿s prediction is that the
imposition of a binding minimum wage increase employment of covered
workers. In this paper we develop a generalized shirking model, that is
40used to predict the eﬀects of a higher minimum wage on the employment
of covered workers. By allowing for features of the low-wage labour mar-
ket that are not captured by the existing models in the ￿eld, we manage to
generate their results as special cases and also allow for more predictions
that except of indicating the limitations and weaknesses of the existing
model, have interesting policy implications. The standard shirking eﬃ-
ciency wages model predicts that an increase in the wage, decreases the
propensity to shirk, and thus monitoring intensity must fall, for eﬀort to
remain constant. Given that monitoring intensity is negatively correlated
with the number of employees in the ￿rm and positively with the quan-
tity of supervisors, an increase in the wage must increase employment,
for given supervision, and decrease supervision for given employment.
Moreover, using the same rational of the shirking model, an increase in
employment, must necessarily lead to an increase in supervision, in order
for eﬀort to remain unchanged (employment and supervision are strate-
gic complements). The above predictions hold, for eﬀort or any other
employee￿s qualitative characteristic that also depends on the incentive
schemes provided by the ￿rm, being constant in each case. Therefore, we
normally expect that if the employer uses the wage and monitoring in-
tensity to adjust any kind of employee￿s performance characteristic, then
the standard eﬃciency wages predictions may not be always the case.
However, this is not the case in Calvo-Wellisz (1979), where employers
m a ya l w a y sb ei n t e r e s t e di nk e e p i n ge ﬀort ￿xed into a maximum capac-
ity level, but they adjust employees quality in the light of any exogenous
shock. In the contrary, we show that under our general environment,
wage and supervision and employment and supervision may be strategic
complements as well as strategic substitutes and an increase in the wage,
for given supervision, decreases employment always, re￿ecting the fact
that is often the case as suggested by Brown (1999) that if employers
increase the eﬀort requirement on the job to oﬀset the cost of a higher
minimum wage then the negative employment eﬀect may be magni￿ed,
rather than mitigated, as it is the case with other kind of oﬀsets. This
￿nding has some important implications for empirical studies that try
to test the validity of the shirking model, as it provides a theoretical
explanation of why studies (Neal 1993, Kruse 1992, Leonard 1987) that
try to identify the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ, and do not control for de-
terminants of employee￿s performance rendered inconclusive. We further
show that under an eﬃciency wages environment, with endogenous su-
pervisory resources the total employment eﬀect of a higher minimum
41wage can be decomposed into two eﬀects; the ￿partial￿ wage eﬀect and
the ￿supervision￿ eﬀect. The former represents the eﬀect of an increase
in the wage, for given supervision, which in our model and when workers
are heterogeneous is negative, whereas the supervision eﬀect depends on
whether or not employment and supervision and wage and supervision
are complements or substitutes. In particular, under workers heterogene-
ity, if the wage and supervision are complements, then employment and
supervision are complements, the supervision eﬀect is positive and thus
the employment eﬀect of the introduction of a minimum wage is ambigu-
ous. An interesting result, under this case, that is not the case in models
of similar ￿avor, is that it is also possible for both employment and su-
pervision to increase after the increase in the minimum wage. Ambiguity
as far as the employment eﬀect of a higher wage also arises, if employ-
ment and supervision are substitutes and thus wage and supervision are
also substitutes. Nevertheless, in this case employment of covered work-
ers falls but supervision may also rise, re￿ecting the neoclassical predic-
tion of substitution of high-skilled for low-skilled workers. Finally, if the
wage and supervision are substitutes and employment and supervision
are complements, then the supervision eﬀect is negative and both em-
ployment of workers and supervision fall. Under workers￿ homogeneity,
the minimum wage employment and supervision elasticity may be zero,
negative or positive, depending on the assumptions imposed. We show
that, if the minimum wage employment elasticity is positive, then this
holds locally and it is higher, if supervision is assumed to be constant.
The same holds for the range up to which, one can increase the wage and
increase employment. Rebitzer and Taylor result that a higher minimum
wage will increase employment, cannot be sustained under endogenous
supervision. However, their result remains the same in sign and mag-
nitude, for a just binding minimum wage, with endogenous supervision
choice, if the production function exhibits constant returns to scale and
workers are randomly assigned between production and supervision. Our
￿ndings that, if certain conditions are met, a higher minimum wage may
increase employment of heterogeneous workers, when supervision is ￿xed
rebuts the validity of Lin￿s predictions. Furthermore, we infer that the as-
sumption that in Calvo-Wellisz the production function exhibits constant
returns to scale into eﬃcient labour units is critical for Calvo-Wellisz re-
sult that up to a point an increase in the minimum wage will increase
employment of workers and decrease employment of supervisors. If this
assumption is relaxed, the minimum wage eﬀect on employment becomes
42ambiguous, as we also show in our heterogeneous workers case. Our the-
oretical prediction sreconcile with recent empirical studies (Card 1992a,
1992b, Card-Krueger 1994, 1995, Dickens, Machin and Manning, 1993
and Machin-Manning 1994), that ￿nd a small positive, a zero or even
an insigni￿cantly negative estimate of the employment eﬀect of a higher
minimum wage. Since the validity of a theoretical model depends on the
accuracy at which it can explain observed phenomena, we try to check
whether or not our model can be used to explain observed phenomena
in a low-wage industry. Particularly, there is evidence from the fast food
industry that support the shirking eﬃciency wages story (Krueger 1991).
Moreover the fast food industry is a low-wage industry and the minimum
wage has a signi￿cant bite and there are also supervisory workers on the
job. Given, these observations, we should expect that our model may
explain any estimated employment eﬀect of a higher minimum wage in
this low-wage industry. In fact, we believe that, the employment gains
in low-wage restaurants compared to high-wage restaurants, in the fast
food industry, in Texas and Pennsylvania as estimated by Card-Krueger
(1994) and Katz-Krueger(1992) can be explained by our general theoret-
ical model. Finally, some interesting hypotheses for future research arise:
the employer-size wage eﬀect cannot be explained solely by monitoring
diﬃculties and thus it may not provide a satisfactory test for the valid-
ity of the shirking model. On the other hand, any attempt to identify
a wage supervision trade-oﬀ suﬀers from endogeneity and measurement
error problems (Rebitzer 1995). An alternative way to test the validity
of the shirking eﬃciency wages story would be to identify whether or
not larger in size establishments tend to supervise their employees more
intensively, after controlling for the wage. In fact, there is little evidence
supporting this hypothesis (Neal 1993). Finally, an empirical test of the
shirking eﬃciency wages predictions could provide us with estimates of
the ￿partial￿ wage and the ￿supervision￿ eﬀect, rendering possible to cali-
brate our theoretical model in order to ￿nd an estimate of the minimum
wage employment elaticity.
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8.1 The eﬀect of a just binding minimum wage,
when workers are homogeneous and are ran-
domly assigned between employment and su-
pervision.
From (31) we have
dN
dw
= Nw + NL
dL
dw
(A.1)
and
ΠLL = fLL − cNN(NL)
2N − cNNLL − 2cN(NL)
2 = fLL − 2cN(NL)
2(A.2)
,a si tc a nb es h o w nt h a tcNN = NLL =0 .F r o m(35), (50)and (A.2)and
if the production function exhibits constant returns to scale in eﬃcient
labour units, we get that;
dL
dw
= −
Nw
NL
, (A.3)
Therefore, from (A.1)and (A.3)it is derived that:
dN
dw
=0 , (A.4)
Thus, it is derived that under homogeneity of workforce(or hetero-
geneity if there are values for r,s,q such that θ
∗ =1 ), with constant
returns to scale production technology, the pro￿t maximizing wage is the
employment maximizing wage and the supervision eﬀect is zero, which
in turn implies that the employment eﬀect of a just binding minimum
wage, under endogenous supervision is identical with the employment
eﬀect, under exogenous supervision. This holds in Calvo-Wellisz (1979).
Thus, because of the assumption of constant returns to scale, Calvo-
Wellisz fail to show that the employment eﬀect of a binding minimum
wage is in general more pronounced under exogenous supervision. More-
over, in their model, if the production technology exhibited decreasing
returns to scale the total employment eﬀect of a just binding minimum
wage becomes ambiguous.
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8.2 The decomposition of the total employment ef-
fect of the minimum wage into the partial wage
and supervision eﬀect
Using ￿gure 1 we will prove that the sign or the direction of the change in
employment L, after the minimum wage increase depends on the partial
wage eﬀect, which in fact is the shift of LL locus for a change in w,p l u s
the supervision eﬀect which is the product of the slope of the LL locus
in (L,N) space with the shift of NN locus. Initially, employment and
supervision pair is given by point A. The increase in the wage, for L
unchanged, shifts NN locus to the right and, given that the LL locus is
not shifting, the new pair of (L,N) is given by point B. If, after the wage
shock we allow for LL to shift, keeping N constant, then LL shifts to
the right and the pair of optimal L and N moves from point A to point
C. Accounting for both changes in LL and NN locus respectively, the
optimal (L,N) pair is given by point D. The total change in L and N is
45given by comparing L and N in point A with L and N in point D. On the
other hand the levels of N and L in D, can be derived by the diﬀerence
between the levels of N and L of point B and C. Consider ￿rstly the
change in (L,N) arising by the shift of NN, and thus by moving from
A to B. The change from A to B is given by the slope of LL in point A
(the slope of LL and NN is the same in all points):
slopL =
chL1
chN1
, (B.1)
where slopL stands for the slope of LL locus and chL1, chN1are the
changes in L and N,w h e nNN shifts out. Moreover, the change in N
is given by the vertical distance AE which consists of two parts: the
shift in NN and the horizontal distance IE. Furthermore the horizontal
distance IE is given by the quotient product of the slope of NN locus by
the change in L.T h u s(B.1)is equivalent to:
slopL =
chL1
shN +
chL1
slopN
, (B.2)
where shN is the shift of N. Solving (B.2) w.r.t chL1, and using
(B.1)to solve also for chN1we derive:
chL1 =
slopN ∗ shN ∗ slopL
slopN − slopL
, (B.3)
chN1 =
shN ∗ slopN
slopN − slopL
, (B.4)
Using the same procedure to derive the changes in N and L arising
by moving from point A to point C, we conclude that :
chL2 =
slop ∗ shL
slopN − slopL
, (B.5)
chN2 =
shL
slopN − slopL
, (B.6)
The total change in L and N is derived by combining , (B.3), (B.4),
(B.5)and (B.6):
chL =
slopN(slopL ∗ shN + shL)
(slopN − slopL)
, (B.7)
46.
chN =
slopN ∗ shN + shL
(slopN − slopL)
, (B.8)
We know that in this case, slopN and slopL are positive, with slopN
being always greater than slopL. Therefore, by (B.7)and (B.8)we have:
sign(chL)=sign(shL + slopL ∗ shN), (B.9)
sign(ch)=sign(shN +
1
slopN
∗ shL), (B.10)
orN
sign(chL)=sign(
∂L
∂w
+
∂L
∂N
|LL ∗
∂N
∂w
),(B.11)
sign(chN)=sign(
∂N
∂w
+
1
∂L
∂N|NN
∗
∂L
∂w
), (B.12)
by (B.11)and (B.12) it turns out that the change in employment depends
on the ￿partial￿ wage on employment and on the ￿supervision￿ eﬀect and
the change in supervision depends on the ￿partial￿ wage on supervision
eﬀect and the ￿employment￿ eﬀect.
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a (0,a
0] (a
0,a
00) [a
00,1)
ηε < −1
2(= 1
2,for a = a
0) > −1
2 > 0(= 0,for a = a
00)
dL
dw − − +(= 0,f o ra = a
00
)
dN
dw −(= 0, a = a
0) + +
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10 Figures
In this ￿gure we present possible changes of optimal L and N when the
wage and supervision and employment and supervision are complements,
which means that both loci are upward sloping and that NN shifts out,
when the minimum wage is increased. As it is depicted in the ￿gure,
diﬀerent changes in L and N are possible, depending on the magnitude
of the shifts and the relative slopes. For example if the relative shifts
and slopes are such that, after the imposition of the minimum wage the
equilibrium pair of N and L moves from A to points B, C or D, then
employment and supervision increase. However, it is possible for the
relative shifts and slopes of the loci to be such that after the imposition
of the minimum wage, the optimal (L,N) pair moves to points E or
F, where employment falls and supervision increases or to points G, H,
where both supervision and employment fall.
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Figure 3 illustrates possible changes in N and L, when wage and
supervision are substitutes and employment and supervision are comple-
ments. As it is depicted in the ￿gure, no matter the magnitude of the
relative slopes and relative shifts of the optimal loci both employment
and supervision fall, in this case.
50Figure 4:
In ￿gure 4, it is presented the case of Calvo-Wellisz model, when
workers are heterogeneous and supervision endogenous. The only diﬀer-
ence with case 2 of our model and Calvo-Wellisz is that in Calvo -Wellisz
there is a neighborhood of the unconstrained wage where employment
increases if the wage is increased and supervision is held constant and
thus LL l o c u ss h i f t su p .I nt h i sc a s e ,a si nc a s e1 ,t h ec h a n g ei ne m p l o y -
ment of covered workers and supervisors depends on the relative slopes
and shifts of the optimal loci. Hence, the possible changes by the ￿gure
are either both employment and supervision increases, (which is not the
case in Calvo-Wellisz because of certain conditions that they impose), or
employment increases and supervision falls(which is the result of Calvo-
Wellisz), or both employment and supervision fall (which we show that
it is the case in Calvo-Wellisz for a suﬃciently high wage increase in
the range where the partial employment eﬀect is positive). These possi-
ble adjustments re￿ect the fact that monitoring intensity falls, when the
wage increases.
51Figure 5:
In ￿gure 5, we present the comparative statics result of a higher min-
imum wage on employment and supervision when wage and supervision,
and employment and supervision are substitutes. Again there is not only
one possible way of optimal adjustment. In fact the adjustment again de-
pends on the relative slopes (the diﬀerence between the partial elasticity
of employment w.r.t supervision and the inverse of the partial elasticity
of supervision w.r.t employment), and relative shifts (the relative elas-
ticities of employment and supervision w.r.t. the wage. The possible
cases are either for employment to increase and supervision to fall (this
case is dismissed in our model, as it turns out that monitoring intensity
always increases), or for both supervision and employment to rise or for
employment to rise and supervision to fall.
52Figure 6:
In this ￿gure it is depicted the eﬀect of an exogenous increase in the
wage of supervisors on employment and supervision, when the wage and
supervision are substitutes in incentives and employment and supervision
are strategic complements (case 1). However, the same analysis can be
applied if case 2 is the case. It turns out that, however big is the shift of
NN locus, employment and supervision will fall after the increase in the
minimum wage of supervisors.
53Figure 7:
In ￿gure 7, it is depicted the change in optimal L and N, for an
increase in the minimum wage of supervisors, when the wage and su-
pervision and employment and supervision are strategic substitutes. It
is clear that however big the shift of NN locus employment of covered
workers increases and supervision decreases.
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